



1	THE COURT: All right. Let's go on the
2	record. Does anybody know anything about Angela
3	Arellanes? Maybe that's her coming in.
4	There you are. I was just asking about
5	you.
6	All right. So it looks like everybody has
7	got an attorney.
8	And, Ms. Sirignano, I think you have your
9	expert, Tim Bryan, here today?
L 0	MS. SIRIGNANO: Yes, Your Honor. Good
L1	afternoon. This is Mr. Bryan here.
L 2	THE COURT: All right. And Ms. Fox-Young,
L 3	are you on the phone?
L 4	MS. FOX-YOUNG: I am, Your Honor. Good
L 5	afternoon.
L 6	THE COURT: And you'll be joining us
L 7	shortly?
L 8	MS. FOX-YOUNG: Yes.
L 9	THE COURT: All right. And you also have
20	Michelle Anderson coming a little later today?
21	MR. VILLA: She's going to join me, Your
22	Honor. Rochelle Anderson.
23	THE COURT: Rochelle. Is there any other
24	changes to counsel from Friday?
25	MR. BENJAMIN: Brock Benjamin, Your Honor.



1	THE COURT: Mr. Benjamin, good afternoon to
2	you.
3	Ms. Sirignano?
4	MS. SIRIGNANO: Mr. Adams is on his way
5	from the airport and will be here shortly.
6	MR. DAVIDSON: Mr. Blackburn will be
7	joining us later on this afternoon or tomorrow
8	morning.
9	THE COURT: Anyone have issues with
10	counsel?
11	MR. VILLA: Your Honor, I think
12	Ms. Fox-Young intends to be here around 1:00, but she
13	will be on the phone. I'm not sure exactly where
14	they are in transit. I didn't want you to think she
15	was going to walk in.
16	THE COURT: No, I knew it was later today
17	is what I've been told.
18	All right. If I understand what we were
19	going to do, and that is we were going to take up the
20	recording device first thing this afternoon. Is that
21	everybody's agreement?
22	MR. BECK: That's right, Your Honor.
23	THE COURT: Let me make a few comments
24	about that, then I'll hear what anybody wants to tell
2.5	me or argue I guess I was surprised by the quality



amount of material that was put into the motion. I
don't know if this is something that is stock around
the country, this is an issue, or what. But it did
seem to me the Government was working pretty hard to
protect these devices. On the other hand, there was
a lot of material disclosed in there. And so I guess
I have two reactions to it. One, is there is so much
material disclosed in there, what is the Government
concerned about, because they've given so much
information? What is that it they're trying to keep
secret? And I guess, on the flip side, the
defendants now have so much information about these
recording devices, why do you need to see the ones
that the Government actually used here? It seems to
me that the defendants have gotten a lot of
information here, and I'm not sure why they need to
actually see the devices that the Government has.

So -- and I know that Ms. Sirignano wanted to respond to this motion. That may make some sense, given the effort the Government has put in to protecting these devices. I think I want to move cautiously and deliberately on this, and not make any sort of rash decisions. If it really does implicate national security, I think it's in all of us' interests to be careful about forcing the disclosure



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So with those comments, Mr. Beck, it's your motion to reconsider an oral -- I think my memory is -- and you can correct me if I'm wrong -- you were having some difficulty getting the FBI to respond quickly and fully about these devices. And so the oral order was primarily to get somebody's attention, and let's have an informed debate about it. So it's teed up as a motion to reconsider, but it's probably really the first time we're looking at it in this depth.

MR. BECK: I think that's right, Your
Honor. And I'll respond to a couple of the
preliminaries that the Court brought up. The
Government's interest is in protecting the method of
how these devices are secreted in the prison or
hidden in the prison. And primarily just dimensions
of the devices, the look of the devices.

THE COURT: If you've disclosed the exact model that you used here, can't they get information?

MR. BECK: It's possible they can. I don't know what is out there in the public sphere. They cannot --

THE COURT: So you're concerned about them seeing the size of it, the actual size and shape?



MR. BECK: And being able to see the size
and shape, number one, but also sort of the
counterintelligence. Now, it's my understanding that
you can't just plug in this device with the USB cord
or like a lightning wire that we have for our
iPhones, or something like that; that you need
special hardware and software to do anything with
these devices. But that's what the Government's
interested in protecting, as well as just how these
devices may look in person. Aside from that, it's
being able to actually access the devices.
So ADS, the company that makes these, I
don't know whether there is information on the
internet of what a HAWK8 device looks like.
THE COURT: Do they sell these to anybody
but the federal government?

MR. BECK: They sell them -- and Special Agent Williamson will have more details about where they sell them. They sell them to government. I believe they sell them to federal and local and state. But I'm not sure on that. And I think they sell them outside the United States to other governments. But it's a proprietary device, it's a proprietary software. You and I can't go to ADS and try to purchase one of these. They don't give the



FBI their software, they don't give law enforcement agents their software. So they have protections in place, the data integrity systems, for reasons that may appear obvious, after reading the brief.

THE COURT: So shape, and size, and then the charging device, how they are charged?

MR. BECK: It's not how they're charged. It's how the data on the device is accessed and downloaded. So they're not charged. They use batteries, as becomes obvious when some of the data is looked at, you see the batteries ran dead. But the way in which the data is downloaded.

THE COURT: You attached some transcripts of some hearings. Has any judge or court ordered the production of these, and have they been produced elsewhere?

MR. BECK: Speaking with the FBI

Operational Technology Division, the attorneys that I spoke with could not say. They had never experienced a court ordering disclosure of these devices. They couldn't say for sure that it had never happened before they'd been there. But one of the attorneys, I think, had been there 10 or 15 years. So in the last --

THE COURT: They're not aware of anybody?





MR. BECK: That's right, Your Honor.

That's right.

And so we can either have response, or I can put Special Agent Williamson up on the stand, and he can go through some of these things. I do think it's probably helpful to the defense at least -- and that's one of the reasons that the brief is as long it is, is that the Government is not trying to hide things.

THE COURT: I'm not trying to insult you by this, but was this something that was written in Washington and sent out?

MR. BECK: No.

THE COURT: You wrote it.

MR. BECK: Yes. And I provided it to the attorneys in Washington so that they could make sure that this was publicly available information and okay for public filing. But, yeah, it was based on my discussions with them. And so what I was trying to do here was disclose as much information as I could for everyone in the room, so that everyone would see, basically, they have everything that they may get, other than by looking at the devices, which could be used nefariously, if they're able to inspect these devices.



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And so what I was saying is I know that we 1 2 have come up with issues in this case in which the 3 metadata that's displayed through ADS's software, is 4 not accurate in terms of real world. 5 And I was willing to -- I thought it may be helpful for everyone to have Special Agent Williamson 6 7 explain how that came about, and that that inaccurate 8 metadata is actually the same data that was on the recorder when it recorded. 9 10 THE COURT: All right. So you are going to 11 put on Mr. Williamson? 12 MR. BECK: I think so, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Williamson, if 14 you'll come up and stand next to the witness box on 15 my right, your left, before you're seated, Ms. 16 Standridge will swear you in. 17 HUGH S. WILLIAMSON, after having been first duly sworn under oath, 18 19 was questioned and testified as follows: 20 DIRECT EXAMINATION THE CLERK: Please be seated. 21 State your 22 full name, spelling it for the record. 23 My name is Hugh S. Williamson THE WITNESS: 24 H-U-G-H, Hugh. S as in Sam. Williamson, 25 W-I-L-L-I-A-M-S-O-N.





THE COURT: Mr. Williamson. 1 Mr. Beck. 2 BY MR. BECK: 3 Special Agent Williamson, how are you 0. 4 employed? 5 I'm the Supervisory Special Agent at the Α. 6 FBI, assigned to the Operational Technology Division. 7 0. And where are you located? 8 Α. In the Audio Surveillance Unit at Quantico. 9 Q. What is your actual job title? 10 Α. I'm the Program Manager for the FBI's 11 Covert Body Recorder Program. 12 And what are your duties in that role? 13 I supervise engineers, electronics 14 technicians, in the acquisition, testing, and 15 maintenance of body recorders used throughout the 16 FBI. 17 Ο. How long have you been the program manager? Since 2013. 18 Α. 19 0. What did you do before that? 20 Prior to that, I was a Supervisory Special Α. Agent in the Operational Technology Division, working 21 22 coordination of technical support investigations. 23 And prior to that, at the Counterterrorism Division, I was a supervisor for five years. 24



What kind of training and experience do you

Ο.

- have with what I'm going to call ADS devices? ADS being the company that manufactures these devices.
- A. Training provided by the FBI to tech agents and to ETs in the use and maintenance of the devices, and training through on-the-job training working with the devices in the company.
- Q. Have you ever been qualified to give expert testimony in a case before?
- A. Yes, sir.
- 10 Q. And when was that?
- 11 A. That was in the Peterson trial, and I 12 believe that was 2016.
- Q. Have you ever testified in court about ADS devices before?
- 15 A. Yes.

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- Q. And do you remember the case that that was in?
- A. That was in Cleveland, and I think that

 was -- actually, that was 2015, the other was 2016 -
 February 2015, a federal trial in Cleveland.
- Q. And other than those two trials, have you ever provided in-court testimony?
 - A. No, sir.
 - Q. Generally, what is a body recorder?
- 25 A. It's a small, solid state digital recorder,



- a little computer. All it does is record audio.
- Q. Are you aware of what audio recording devices were used in this case, which I'll call the SNM case?
 - A. I provided the makes and models of the ones that were utilized, yes.
 - Q. What are those devices?
 - A. The ones I'm aware of was a HAWK8, and a RAVEN2A are the ones specifically. And then, I think there may have been an EAGLE as well.
 - Q. And who manufactures those three devices?
- 12 A. They're manufactured by Adaptive Digital 13 Systems, ADS.
 - Q. Can you tell us a little bit about the data integrity systems between ADS and FBI that provide the framework for these Bird devices, these ADS devices?
 - A. The FBI hired ADS to make a one-way recorder, all it could do is record and download. It can't be tampered with by agents, or anyone else. And in order to do that, the ADS manufacturer uses proprietary software on the device to manage how it functions, and an onboard device. It uses cyclic redundancy checks to make sure that the data it collects has a CRC hash, as well as when it's



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downloaded, it uses a SHA256 encryption algorithm to hash the final data.

Q. There was lot there to unpack. We'll come back to a lot of it.

What do you mean a one-way recording?

- A. Basically, you turn it on; it energizes the microphone, which sends a signal to the transducer, to the chip that turns it into digital information.

 And it's recorded as you're recording on the device.

 And when you turn it off, it stops doing that.
- 11 Q. How does the person using the device turn 12 it off or on?
 - A. It can be turned on or off manually, or it can be programmed to be turned on and off using the USBird software.
 - Q. When you talked about the data and the coding on the device, does the FBI have source code or a way to access that code?
 - A. No. That is held by ADS. And deliberately so. We don't want to know what it is. We want to be able to say that we have no access to the device; can't control it, can't do anything to it except for the propriety software that allows you certain functions.
 - Q. Now, the person using the device in the



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real world, with the on and off switch, can they manipulate the date on the device?

- A. They can only turn it on and turn it off.
- Q. Can they record over what's on the device?
- A. No.

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- Q. Can they rewind it?
- A. No.
- Q. Does the device have a -- what I'll refer to as a computer screen, some screen on it, where you can see the data that's on there or the tracks, or recording sessions? Does the device have that computer screen?
 - A. No.
- Q. Now, explain to me -- explain to us all how these different, what I'll refer to as recording sessions come about. How are they created?
- A. When the recorder is turned on, the recorder begins collecting audio and putting it into the device. And it creates a session, an audio session, and attaches -- as I said, the cyclic redundancy checks are created as it's doing that in that session. And as long as that session -- as long as it's turned on, it will continue to record. If it reaches a certain length, it will stop that session and begin a new session of recording, in terms of it



will be a new file. It will still be recording, it will be an unbroken recording in that regard. But you won't hear anything when you listen to it. It won't stop recording until it runs out of power or you turn it off.

- Q. If it runs out of power to stop the recording, versus the user turning off the device, is there a way that we can know that looking back at what was on the recorder?
- A. Yes. When the recorder runs out of power, the program on the recorder is designed to indicate that it occurred, and it will gave you a flag. And it's on the Bird player as well that's provided with the evidence, it gives the flag to indicate if that happens.
- Q. And is that also true -- do we get a flag when the device itself, I think, as you said, breaks the recording into different sessions?
- A. Yes, there is a series of flags that ADS has designed into it to indicate certain things that occur on the recorder. Not everything. One of them is a flag to indicate when the session has reached a certain length and it breaks it up. And it does that so it can provide the right size to put on an evidentiary disc.



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- Q. So it sounds like one way a session is created is the user turns the device on and then off again; is that true?
 - A. Yes.

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- Q. Another way is if the device splits the file because of its size; is that true?
 - A. That can happen, too, yes.
- Q. And then a third way is that the device would run out of power?
- A. There is one where it's a low battery, or power stops, is two different flags.
- Q. All right. Is there another way in which a recording session may be created?
 - A. I don't understand the question.
- Q. Is there another -- beside those three, on and off; the internal software, file size, and the running out of power in some method, is there another way in which a recording session may be created on the device?
 - A. Not that I'm aware of.
- Q. How is the information, the data on the device taken off of the device?
 - A. The data on the device is downloaded using USBird software. And it's proprietary software that -- it's the only way you can see the device,





when you mount it to your computer, it's the only way that you can see that it has recordings on it. And it allows you to download those recordings to an evidentiary disc.

- Q. Who downloads the recordings onto the evidentiary disc?
- A. In the FBI, depending on the division, different personnel could do it. It could be a case agent. It could be an evidentiary operations technician.
- Q. Are you aware of how it works in the Albuquerque office?
- A. My understanding in Albuquerque is that all ELSUR is downloaded by ELSUR operations technicians.
- Q. I want to go a little bit more in-depth about when the information is downloaded. What's your understanding of what is created on this evidentiary disc when you download it, how that's made?
- A. When the USBird software conducts a download of evidence from the recorder, it takes all of the recorded sessions, all the sessions that are collected, and takes the metadata that's on the recorder. And there is another file called an IDS file, which is used when you have a video recording,



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which was not used in this case. And it creates a SHA256 hash calculation for that -- those files.

- Q. What's a SHA256 hash creation? I just learned this this morning, so it may be helpful for some.
- A. It's a secure hash algorithm that was created by NSA, and was released through the federal government to all industry in 2001. It's the National Institutes of Standards hash algorithm to secure data, to show that something that was created, the data that was on a computer or device that was downloaded is the same as it was before. It creates a unique hash to the ones and zeros that make up those files.
- Q. What happens if you're downloading from the recording device, and you don't download all the data onto the evidentiary disc?
- A. If you don't download all the data from the recorder onto a disc, it's not considered evidence. It has to be everything downloaded to be evidence. That's the way it's designed. You have to download everything from the recorder onto an evidentiary disc. And if you don't do that, the device -- you can't erase it. And also, if you go to try and make another recording, it won't let you make another



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- Q. What happens when all of the data is downloaded from the device onto the evidentiary disc?
 - A. In terms of the process, or --
 - Q. Yes.
- A. The USBird software, as I said, it generates a SHA256 hash calculation. And it checks it against the original, and then it burns it to a disc that is finalized. And the disc itself being finalized cannot be manipulated. And it allows you to go back, if you desire, if you need to, to erase the recorder. And you have to erase the recorder if you want to use it again.
- Q. Now, the information on the recorder, if you do erase the recorder after the evidentiary disc, is that information stored anywhere else besides the evidentiary disc?
- A. No. And the way that ADS software works, it writes ones and zeros all over the recorder's short-term memory, or its flash memory, they call it.
- Q. Is that information, when you download it, stored on an FBI hard drive as well as the disc?
- A. It can be copied and put onto something else. But the evidence is stored in an ELSUR operations storage room.

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- Q. The evidence -- are you referring to the disc itself is stored in the ELSUR --
 - A. The disc itself.

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- Q. What I'm asking, the information that goes on that evidentiary disc, is that stored in the cloud or at FBI headquarters?
- A. In some cases, it is uploaded to certain databases in other types of investigations; not -- to my knowledge, it could also be put into other databases used for language review, if you had a language you needed to review evidence, a copy of it could be put up there. But it would be a copy of the evidence. It wouldn't be the original evidence.
- Q. Was there a backup of the evidentiary discs in this case?
- A. I understand there are copies. I have several copies here.
 - Q. Besides copies on CDs, is there a backup in a computer or mainframe or cloud?
 - A. There is not that I know of, not for this case, no.
- Q. How can you ensure that the data that was on your recording device is the same data that was put on the evidentiary disc?
 - A. Well, we know that the ADS software, using





1	proprietary software, creates a hash calculation.
2	And it provides a text file, which is that hash
3	calculation. And that's part of the original
4	evidence created at download. And you can go back
5	and you can run a SHA256 calculation against what you
6	have in evidence, using an after-market SHA256
7	calculator, and compare it to the hash calculation
8	that was originally created with USBird software, is
9	one method.

- Q. And did you do that to validate some of the evidentiary discs in this case?
 - A. I did.

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MR. BECK: At this time, Your Honor, I'd like Special Agent Williamson to demonstrate how he checked the evidentiary disc, what we're calling D55 -- checked the metadata, with this third party SHA256 software to ensure that what was downloaded from the device is the same as what appears on the evidentiary disc, which the defendants have.

THE COURT: All right. You may.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

- Q. And just go ahead, and if you would, Special Agent Williamson, narrate what you're doing on your computer there for us in the courtroom.
 - A. So first --



THE COURT: Let me ask Ms. Jacks, Ms. 1 2 Sirignano, y'all have been the most interested in 3 If a couple of you want to come up closer and stand over here, you're welcome to do it. 4 5 Okay, thank you. I thought we MS. JACKS: 6 were going to see it on the screen. 7 THE COURT: Oh, we're going to see it on 8 the screen. Okay. Okay. First, to show -- this is the player 9 Α. software. It shows the sessions for D55, which is --10 11 By the player software, you're referring to Ο. 12 what comes on these evidentiary discs entitled 13 player.exe; is that right? 14 I can show you that file. Here is Α. Yes. 15 that HAWK file here. And these files here are all 16 files that are used to make the player work, dll 17 files, they have nothing to do with the evidence, it just makes the player play what's on the evidence, 18 19 which is this file here, 1168. 20 Special Agent Williamson, I'm going to cut Ο. you off right there. So 1168, is that the serial 21 22 number of the device used in that case? 23 Yes, that's the serial number for the HAWK8 that was used. So on that file, there is 11 sessions 24



or 11 files represent 11 sessions, and the IDS file,

which I mentioned is when you have a video recording 1 2 and you have to translate that video evidence so the 3 Windows machine can see video. That was not used 4 There is no video. The RCD file which 5 contains the metadata. And that RCD file, we can't There is a proprietary hash that ADS puts 6 access it. 7 on that, so I can't go in there and manipulate that 8 RCD file. But it is a hash calculation against all these files. 9 10 Not unless you go in and manipulate that 11 file right there, .RCD, on our computer? 12 No one can. Only the vendor can go back 13 and look at it and tell you what's on there without 14 going through a USBird software. It would only allow 15 certain information.

THE COURT: Mr. Beck. Let me make sure I got everybody on the phone. I know I had Ms. Fox-Young.

Ms. Strickland, are you on the phone? Is there anybody besides Ms. Fox-Young on the phone?

MR. ADAMS: Chris Adams, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Adams, but

Ms. Strickland is not on the phone? Ms. Strickland,

if you're on the phone, do you have your mute button

on?

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All right. Go ahead, Mr. Beck.

- Q. So these files that we're looking at here, which start at 1168.001 and go through 1168.011, is there any way to access those files without the ADS proprietary software that you know of?
- A. No, sir, there is no way, because it's locked down. It only can be seen using their proprietary software, and we don't have the source code for that.
- Q. And are those the files that are on the recording device before it's downloaded?
- A. All these files, 001 through 11, and then the IDS and the RCD file, were on the HAWK recorder before it was downloaded. And then the text file was created by the USBird software when it created the SHA256 hash calculation. And that text file, if I opened it up, will show you the calculation numbers for the 11 and the RCD and the IDS.
- Q. So these are the hash values -- these are the hash values for each of those files? Is that what we're seeing here on this text file?
- A. Yes, sir. And I'd have to go back and show you the USBird verification to show you the original -- how USBird does it.
 - O. All right. I think earlier you said that



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you could check these hash files using a third-party recorder -- or third-party software.

- A. Yes. And so because SHA256 is a national standard, international standard, it's open source to everyone. Anyone can use it, that algorithm is available through third-party vendors. And this is one program that OTD-FBI purchased for our use in this case.
- Q. And so at the top there I see in blue writing of this third-party software, it says http:\\www.quickhashgui.org, is that where you may be able to download this software?
 - A. Yes. I think it's a free download.
 - O. So continue on to show us how verified.
- A. So this software, in particular, provides an ability to check the hash calculation of an item of evidence -- any file that's been hashed against a variety of algorithms. MD5 is one, SHA1. And in this case it's SHA256. So select that algorithm to be used. And everyone has that algorithm. It can be obtained anywhere. And then I select a directory. I don't want to save to it to a CSC so I took care of that.
- Q. So to get to the screen we're looking at that says "select directory," you clicked on the tab



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- at the top of the software that is file capital S; is that right?
- A. Yes, sir, that tab file, capital S, allows you to run the hash against multiple files.
- Q. How did you run the hash against the files on this evidentiary disc?
- A. Using select directory, I found it on the drive where the disc is, go to where the evidence is, to copy evidences. And there is the HAWK folder.

 And there is the 1168 folder. I select that folder.

 And then quick hash will run everything on that folder through a SHA256 algorithm and calculate a
- Q. And that 1168 file we saw there, that's the file we just looked at that had 11268.001 through 1168.011?
 - A. Correct.

value for each file.

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- Q. Go ahead, press "okay" to run it through that file.
 - A. So your result for those files on 55, it provides a -- open this up -- it provides a hash value. So that's the solution. So look at 001, and there is all those numbers and letters. That's the solution or the hash value that was created by SHA256, when it ran that file, 001, all the ones and



zeros in that file through the algorithm. And I can go back and I can compare that.

- Q. When you say "go back," now you're clicking on the notepad icon at the bottom where you had the .txt file open?
- A. Right. And I'll show you where it came from again. This is from the original evidence, this is what was created by the USBird software that is from the ADS recorder. This is a hash calculation value created by USBird when it downloaded the original evidence, is in this file, 1168 text -- .txt. And this is it. And I can take it and I can compare it against the other files that I just hashed.

An example, go to 001, and on the text file from USBird from the ADS recorder, the first four digits are 9DD9. And if you look at 001 through the quick hash, there is 9DD9. You look at the last ends FOCAA. And look down here FOCAA on 001. And the same thing for all these files. I did them last night. They match up. It's a match. I'm absolutely certain these are identical files.

Q. Thank you. If you would, let's go back into the player software. So now we're looking at the player software that comes on the disc, and there

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seems to be -- how many recording sessions are reflected here?

A. Eleven.

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- Q. And how many of those recording sessions -- and you may have to think about this -- how many of those recording sessions were created because the person who had this device turned it on and then back off again manually?
- A. Well, because I know one of them spanned here, I'd have to go back and look at the date -- I'd have to go back and look at the times.
 - Q. When you say, "one of them spanned here" --
- A. Number 8 was definitely a recording that was cut short, so it had to continue recording as another session, because the device said: I'm going to chop this whole session into lengths that can be put onto a disc.
 - Q. And you know that how?
- A. Look at the date and time here on line 8, that is a green flag, which is -- the green flag comes from the flags here provided by ADS. There is a green flag, recording was split due to size limit. So that's something that the recorder created during the recording session. And it was put in there as part of the original session. You look at the date



where it says ending 2/4/2016, the time of 19:52 and 1 2 26 seconds. Look at the next line, line 9. the start time is 2/4/2016, 19:52 and 26 seconds. 3 4 the start time and end time are the same, which tells me that it's a continuation of that same recording 5 that was started at 19:30 on 2/4. And those two 6 7 there are one recording because then it ends at 19 8 minutes 53 seconds. And then there is the -- a new 9 recording begins later. They're not the same, 10 they're not connected. 11 Let me start looking at session 9 and 10 on Ο. 12 this 1168 disc. Does it look to you like session 9 13 ends on February 4 at 19:53:13? 14 Α. Yes. 15 Then session 10 begins at 19:57:20; is that Q. 16 right? 17 Α. Yes. So that's approximately --18 Ο.

- 19 Α. Five minutes.
 - -- five minutes apart. Does that indicate 0. to you -- does that establish that in 9 the device was turned off, and then approximately five minutes later, the user then clicked the on button to turn it back on and begin the next session?
 - Α. If it was a manually turned on and off



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recording, yes.

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- Q. And if this was created with the HAWK8 device, is it a manually operated recording device?
- A. My understanding of the case it was used in the manual mode, yes.
- Q. Now, did you look at another copy of an evidentiary disc that we labeled ID56 in this case?
- A. Yes.
 - Q. Would you put that into the player, please?
- 10 A. There is the HAWK for 56.
- Q. And so this disc -- is your understanding that the serial number of this recorder was 2373?
- 13 | A. Yes.
- 14 O. And how do we know that?
- 15 A. Well, I can go back to USBird.
- Q. That's okay. Do we know that because that's the name of the file there?
- A. Yes, that's the name of the file there,

yes.

- Q. Go ahead and open back up the file there.
- 21 And please bring up the player.exe. And what does
- 22 player.exe convey to us about the dates and times and
- 23 lengths of the recordings on this copy of the
- 24 evidentiary DVD?
- 25 A. Well, knowing ADS recorders, and looking at



this it says 12/30/1899, and the same start and end 1 2 time, and length of zero, I know that what happened 3 is the clock battery -- there is an onboard clock 4 battery on the ADS recorder, that if it goes dead, it 5 no longer generates a time or a date. So there is negative input to the recorder for that information. 6 7 So there is a default entry, which they call an epic time, date, and that's the 12/30/1899. And then, 8 because there is no clock running, then, when the 9 metadata is generating, it won't give duration of the 10 11 It will record, it does record, and I can record. 12 verify this, that it was recording, recorded 13 sessions. You can play them, you can hear them. 14 So if you would play for us recording Ο. 15 session number 1. Just start the player. 16 Α. (Witness complies.) So we heard that there is a recording there 17 in session number 1? 18 19

- Α. Yes.
- Do we know the length of that recording by what you're seeing on the player?
- Α. Down here, that number there is not relevant to the recording.
 - So is that a: No, we don't know? Q.
- 25 Α. You'd have to sit and listen to it with a



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stopwatch. And you could do that. It would come to a known time, because --

- Q. Looking at these sessions, can you tell which of these sessions was created by the person operating it clicking on or off the device?
- A. Only because there is no flag showing. Can
 I say, well --
 - Q. Sure. So I think I was asking a yes or no question.
 - A. Yes, I would say, without having that -- without listening to each individual one and seeing if there is continuity, I can't from the player, no.
 - Q. Okay.

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- A. I can tell from the flag that something occurred, though, that would indicate a connection, recording.
 - Q. It's my understanding, though, that if there was something that happened besides turning on and off the device, it would be reflected by a flag; is that right?
 - A. Certain things would be reflected. The loss of battery power. And again, the flags, the specific flags provided low battery, power fail, the spanning due to size limit, and other ones that don't appear here and don't apply. The camera loss,



- because there was no camera used. And then things don't apply because we don't have GPS involved with this device. And then I don't see the yellow flag.
- Q. So, for instance, if we look at session 13, what does that flag tell us?
- A. 13 is a red flag, and red flag is a recording with low battery, which is basically the battery lost enough power to run the device, so it stopped recording.
- Q. To your understanding, are there two different batteries in this HAWK device?
- A. There are two batteries. There is the
 battery that runs the clock battery, which is like a
 small watch cell size of battery. And there is a
 normal battery that it uses. It has more power to
 run the recorder.
 - O. And which one went out?
- 18 A. The clock battery went bad.
- Q. All right. Now, did you validate the hash values?
- A. Yes. Do you want me to do it with USBird as well?
 - O. No.

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A. So I have the text from the file, and a copy of the evidence it provides.



- Q. I think what I'm asking is did you verify the hash values of this disc?
 - A. Yes, I did.

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- Q. And in that verification, what did you find?
 - A. It was a match. These are identical.
- Q. Does that mean that all of the data that was on the recording device was downloaded to the evidentiary DVD?
- A. Yes. Based on the performance of USBird verification and the confirmation with the quick hash, this information is what was recorded by the recorder and downloaded from the recorder. It's authentic evidence.
- Q. Does the player here on the disc help you understand whether the data on the device matches up with the data on the DVD?
- A. Yes. The data on the device, during recording, it creates a cyclic redundancy check, which is basically a long division problem against every certain block of information. And it records that with the original evidence, and it allows you to go back and see if the solution comes out, if it's been changed or not. If it's been changed, you'll have a failure, you won't have the same solution.



And it's built into this computer, it's built into every computer; pretty much every computer uses something like is this to make sure that data is not corrupted.

In this case, what's on the ADS recorder, a cyclic redundancy check was created, and that was provided with the evidence. And the player looks at that. And if it doesn't solve correctly, it will give you a "check some error."

- Q. So is it your understanding that if the data on the device is the exact same as the data on the evidentiary DVD after the download, that that's why we can see what's on the player and listen to the recording?
- A. It's the only way can you see this evidence, on an ADS USBird player.
 - Q. If they didn't match up --
- A. You'd have an error; you'd have a check some error, and it wouldn't be able to play.
- Q. Did you also look at ID60, a disc that was ID60?
- 22 A. Yes.

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- Q. Would you bring that up?
- A. So this is the disc on 60. Again, the serial number. This is the player display.

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- Q. So with this DVD, is it possible that the dates and times reflected for start and end for session 1 may not be the exact real world dates and times in which these recordings were made?
 - A. Yes. That's very possible.
 - Q. How is that?

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- The date and time can be assigned. Α. we deploy these around the world in different time zones, we require that the vendor give us an ability to set a date and time on the device. So prior to deploying the device, the user, usually a tech user, could be a case agent can, using the USBird software, calibrate the date and time on the device with your date and time clock on your computer. And so it's possible that someone did not correct the date and time on the device, or set it deliberately to another date and time. There was nowhere -- we ship these to different field offices, so it may have been on eastern time, or a different time zone before it was sent to Albuquerque and was never changed.
- Q. So it sounds like the dates and times could be inaccurate based on not setting the device correctly?
 - A. For many reasons, it could be, yes.
 - O. Now, even if that's true, can you account



- for the time between recording session 1 and recording session 2?
- A. I would say, from looking at recording
 session 1, that ends says 13:50, 13 minutes 50
 seconds on the 11th, purportedly. And then the next
 session starts at 12:55 on the 12th. They stopped
 the recorder, and they turned it back up on the next
 day.
 - Q. Why does this tell you that?
- 10 A. Well, I'm looking at the date, 5/11 is when 11 it was ended, session 1, and then starts on 5/12.
- Q. And are those -- and this -- when I'm looking there at recording session 2, and I see 12:55:44 is that hours, minutes, and seconds?
 - A. My understanding that's minutes and seconds. I might have to go back and check.
 - O. Well --

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- 18 A. The way it's written.
- Q. Does it tell you anything -- if we're looking at 12:55:44, we look at 12:57:20, and that's a minute and 36 seconds length, displayed on the player. Does that help you?
- A. Yes, I'm sorry, it's minutes and seconds, and then tenths of seconds.
 - Q. I think that's wrong.



- A. Okay. I'm looking at 12:55:57.
- Q. Yeah. So I think the 55 and 57 --
- 3 A. I'm sorry. Excuse me, it's -- yeah,

4 minutes. So 12 minutes 55 seconds, to -- excuse me 5 55.44 to 57.20, yeah.

- 6 Q. Is that hours, minutes, and --
 - A. Hours, minutes, seconds, yes.
 - Q. Okay. Thank you. And so did you validate -- using the SHA256 algorithm, did you validate the date on this evidentiary disc?
- 11 A. I did.

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- 12 Q. And what did that process tell you?
- A. It was a match; that the hash calculation
 for the evidentiary disc, when I ran it, compared it
 to the hash calculation; with quick hash, they
 matched. It was an identical match.
 - Q. So that means, if the dates and times are off here in this player, they were off when these files were created on the device?
 - A. Yes, correct.
 - Q. All right. Did you also look at disc ID58?
- 22 A. Yes.
- Q. And just bring that up, if you will.

MR. BECK: For the record, I don't know how

25 | it's disclosed to you, but that's how we keep track



1 of things.

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- Q. Is the serial number for this device 0730?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And it looks like, when we bring it up in the player, we don't see any warning flags; is that right?
- A. I see some green flags indicate it's spanned due to the size of the file.
 - Q. And that's -- when you scrolled down, that's from sessions 21 through 34.
- 11 A. 21, 22, 23, 25, 29, 32, and 34 have green 12 flags. They reached their size limit.
- Q. Did you do the hash value validation for this disc, ID58?
- 15 A. Yes.
- 16 O. What did that validation tell you?
- 17 A. Those hash calculations were a match as well.
- Q. So was all the information, all the data on the device downloaded to this evidentiary DVD in the same --
- A. Yes. From what was on the recorder, it's identical to what's on this.
- Q. Okay. And I want to take you back now to the DVD two times ago. You don't have to do anything



- there. I just want to ask you a question about it.

 That was the DVD where all the dates said they were in the year 1899. Do you remember that DVD?
 - Q. Did you do anything with that evidentiary DVD to see if you could, in fact, find dates and times of when those recordings were made?
 - A. Yes. In order -- when we have problems with the recorders or recordings because of some error, we take them to the vendor who owns the proprietary software and have the source code. We will have the Los Angeles division EOT take it to the vendor and sit with the technician as they try to access it, and see what they can see.
 - Q. Did that happen with this DVD?
 - A. We did. We sent it back.
 - Q. And what happened?
- A. They could not recover any data because the clock battery had not provided that data regarding the date and the time.
- MR. BECK: Thank you, Special Agent
 Williamson. Nothing further. And just for the
 record, I couldn't read the handwriting on there.
- 24 | It's actually 1D, not ID for those.
- MS. JACKS: I'm sorry?



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Yes.

1 MR. BECK: It's 1D. I just read it 2 incorrectly. 3 No further questions. 4 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. 5 Beck. 6 Ms. Jacks, do you want to start? 7 MS. JACKS: I do. But I'd just like a 8 moment to confer. 9 THE COURT: You may. 10 EXAMINATION 11 BY MS. JACKS: 12 Good afternoon, Agent Williamson. 13 Α. Good afternoon. 14 I'm going to start with the easy stuff. Ο. 15 First of all, you said you're the program manager for 16 the covert body recording program, right? 17 Α. Yes. 18 So, as the program manager, I think you 19 mentioned you're responsible for the acquisition of 2.0 the devices? I'm not directly responsible for the 21 22 acquisition. Finance division has a protocol in 23 place, through federal law, that governs how we acquire them. These were acquired before I became 24 25 the program manager.



- Q. You mean all the ELSUR devices that we're talking about today?
- A. The contract for their purchase was before I came there.
- Q. Okay. The testing of the devices is under your authority?
- A. The testing that we do at Quantico, the limited testing we do, yes.
- Q. That's to try to make sure that when they go out in the field there is procedures in place that ensure that the devices work as they're supposed to?
 - A. I don't understand your question.
 - Q. Well, what is the testing that you do?
- 14 A. To make sure that they work; power them up,
 15 they actually make a recording and they actually
 16 function the way they're supposed to.
 - Q. Okay. And that you can set the date?
- 18 A. Yes.

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- Q. And that the times reflected on the summary charts that you've shown us today are the actual times?
 - A. That's not set by us. That's set by the operator in the field.
 - Q. What's set by the operator in the field?
 - A. The date and time they're going to use.



- Like I set a date and the time for a recorder, and they go somewhere else, and they want to use their date and time.
- Q. Right. I think you explained that. So, for example, if these devices were checked out in Albuquerque, there would be a person in the Albuquerque office that has the responsibility of setting the devices up with the proper date and time?
- A. I'm not familiar with Albuquerque's procedures.
- Q. So you don't know if the Albuquerque -- the ELSUR person in Albuquerque or people in Albuquerque are tasked with putting in the date --
 - A. No.
 - Q. -- properly?
- 16 A. No.

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- Q. So there is not some sort of national standard for how these devices are to be calibrated before they're sent out in the field?
 - A. When you say "national standard," I don't understand that.
 - Q. The standard that you, as the program manager of the covert body recording program, put in place to ensure that when people use these devices they use them right.



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	Α.	When	we t	each	the	tec	ch ag	ents	how	to	use
them,	we	teach	them	to	set	the	time	and	date	9	
appropriately.											

- Q. Okay. And the tech agents are the people that then would be sent out into the field to manage the ELSUR devices in any particular office?
 - A. They would assist the ELSURs, yes.
 - Q. I'm sorry? They would what?
- A. They would assist the ELSUR operations technician in how to properly do that, yes.
- Q. Okay. So the idea would be that they would train the ELSUR operations technician how to set the time and date?
 - A. And we do also provide training to ELSUR operations technicians to do that as well.
 - Q. Okay. Just so that I understand when you say "ELSUR operations technician," that's the person that would be in the FBI field office?
 - A. They are in the FBI field offices, yes.
 - Q. And who is the person that would be sent out there to train them?
 - A. We don't send anyone out to train them.
 - Q. The person that you were talking about, I think that you actually trained in how to set up the devices, what is that person?





- A. We have regular training of technically trained agents. There is a whole program that does that. And part of their instruction is teach them how to use these devices.
- Q. Okay. So these would be special agents that are technically trained at Quantico on how to operate the devices?
- A. Some of their training does occur at Quantico.
 - Q. And then they would be sent out the various field offices to train the ELSUR operations technicians?
 - A. We also run -- that is one thing that can happen. We also have training, not throughout all ELSUR operations technicians. There is a ELSUR operations technician program that provides training at times. And that's a different unit that does that. Not my unit.
 - Q. And so the ELSUR operations technician would go to that training and learn about the devices, and receive some sort of acknowledgment that they had completed that training?
- A. I would assume so. I don't know. I don't run the program.
- O. Okay. I think you said you were

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- responsible for supervising the maintenance of the ELSUR devices; is that right?
- A. To the degree that we can do that at Quantico, yes.
- Q. Okay. So you supervise the maintenance of the devices that are back in Virginia; is that right?
 - A. Yes.

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- Q. But you don't have anything to do with the maintenance of the devices that are in the other field offices?
- A. We provide guidance, and we ask that certain things be done. But that's part of what is provided the technically trained agents. But they're not the ones always holding the devices.
 - Q. I'm sorry? They're not the ones --
- A. I mean, the tech agents are -- some of the people, ELSUR operations technicians also; it depends on the field office.
- Q. Is there some sort of requirement that a field office have somebody that's been through a specific training that you developed?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And what that is requirement, or what are those requirements?
 - A. They attend the tech training, which is in





- a different unit. And they attend the ELSUR operations training, which is a different unit as well.
- Q. And there has to be, what, one person in each field office that has accomplished those two things?
 - A. I don't know how many people are required.
- Q. In connection with your job as the program manager of the covert body recording program, do you provide any sort of instruction or standards on how the devices are to be used in the field?
- A. There are -- there is training provided in the TTA program that the TTAs are given.
 - Q. The TTAs are the technical training agents?
 - A. Technically trained agents, yes.
 - Q. And are the technically trained agents given instructions on how a person that's given the ELSUR device is supposed to be educated with respect to its operation?
 - A. I don't understand what you mean by that.
 - Q. Well, what I mean is, like, are they told something like: When you give this device to somebody that you're going to ask to use it in a subreptitious fashion, they should be instructed to leave it on during the entire conversation that's at



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- A. That's not something you would teach everybody to do.
- Q. Okay. Is there any requirement or any training that when you're providing this ELSUR device to somebody who is going to use it in the field, they should keep it in their presence for the entire time of the conversations they're recording?
 - A. No.
- Q. Is the information that these technically trained agents are trained on published somewhere?
 - A. Do you mean are there syllabi that exist?
- 13 O. Correct, somewhere within the FBI.
- 14 A. Yes.
- 15 Q. And where is that?
- A. At the Technical Operations Development
 Unit, which is in charge of the TTAs.
 - Q. And they keep records of what sort of topics and things these technically trained agents are educated about?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. Now, Mr. Beck asked you some questions about the ELSUR device actually terminating a session and starting a new session on its own. Do you recall those questions?



- A. It doesn't terminate a session and start a new session by itself.
 - O. Okay. Well --
- A. Unless you say it's spanning the limit, you mean.
 - Q. That's exactly where I was going.
 - A. Yeah. With an excessive size, it will create a new session, yes.
 - Q. Okay. And the ELSUR device does that on its own, without any input from the operator?
- A. The device does it automatically.
- 12 Q. And you're saying that happens when the recording reaches a certain length?
 - A. Yes.

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- Q. And is there some sort of set length on the recording?
 - A. No. It's dependent upon each device's capacity, and when it was -- different devices, my understanding, have different lengths. And I don't know them off the top of my head. I'd have to go look them up.
 - Q. Within the same device, is there a consistent length that is -- then causes a session to terminate and begin a new session?
- 25 A. Well, the models have different series. So



- the HAWK8 had multiple models, or variance. So I don't know if they changed or they are the same.
- Q. What about within a particular HAWK device, within -- when we're looking at these folders here, that are displayed -- let's look at the one that's on the screen. You pulled up the recordings that are designated on HAWK file 0730, right?
 - A. This one here?
- Q. Yes. Does that identify a particular individual HAWK device?
- 11 A. Yes. The HAWK serial number at the top, 12 0730.
 - Q. Okay. And with respect to a particular HAWK device; for example, this one, 0730, would there be a distinct length of time that would then cause a session to terminate and start a new session?
 - A. It wouldn't be time. And again, you're looking at a video -- audio-video recorded, and so it's data; it's based on data.
 - Q. It's based on the amount of data?
- 21 A. Yes.

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Q. So is there, within a device, let's say the amount of data is one gigabyte. If the amount of data exceeds one gigabyte, would it then automatically reset every time?



- A. It's much lower than that.
- Q. Okay. Then you pick the number.
- A. I don't know it off the top of my head.
- 4 I'd have to go find out.
- Q. But do you understand the tenor of my question?
- 7 A. Yes.

- Q. I mean, is it like every time when it hits that limit --
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. -- it would then reset?
- 12 A. When it hits that limit, it will create a
 13 new session. So it can fit all that onto a single
 14 evidentiary disc.
- Q. And on a single recording device that would be consistent over time, according to you?
- 17 A. It should be, yes.
- 18 Q. Now, I think that the device that we're
 19 looking at here, you said that has audio and video?
- A. Excuse me, yeah. In this case, no, it doesn't. It has no video at the top, and it has stereo, so it's just audio for this one.
- Q. Okay. So if a device like this device,

 O730, is simply recording audio, would you expect it

 to start a new session after a particular amount of





time in a consistent fashion? 1 2 Α. No. 3 Okay. And why is that? Ο. 4 Α. Because it's based on data, not time. So it would depend on the amount of 5 Ο. 6 talking? Or noise, how much information is coming 7 Α. 8 through the microphone. So I want to talk to you about the first 9 Ο. 10 evidentiary disc that you discussed. 11 unfortunately, we don't have them identified the same 12 as you. But it was the first one that you pulled 13 up -- I think it had -- it was 1168. And I think you 14 had a total of 11 sessions. The file was 1168. 15 Α. Let me see. 16 MS. JACKS: Do you know which one it was? 17 MR. BECK: It was 1D55. 18 Do you want me to put that one on? Α. 19 Ο. Please. Yeah, that's the one. Thanks. 20 So, just to reiterate the last -- I guess 21 the last series of questions. If you look at session 22 8, that recorded 21 minutes 55 seconds of audio; is 23 that right?



seconds.

Α.

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Yes. The length shows 21 minutes 55

- Then the green flag shows that the session Ο. was terminated, and a new session was automatically started by the device? Α. Yes. Because the size limit was exceeded? 0. Α. Yes. And then the second part of that same conversation lasted about 47 seconds; is that right? Α. Yes. If you look at session 6, how much time did that session go for? It says 37 minutes 14 seconds. Ο. Okay. And does the software show any indication that that session was broken into pieces? No, it shows that it was turned off. Α. It shows that the operator of the device Ο. turned it off? Α. Yes.
- 20 Α.

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With respect to the dates on this series of recordings, do you know on this particular one whether the recordings occurred on the dates as indicated?

After 37 minutes and 14 seconds?

25 Α. I have no idea.

Yes.





- 1 Q. No idea?
 - A. None.

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- Q. And the only way you would know that, or I'm sorry, the only way you could determine if the dates were correct is to know when the device was provided to the person operating it?
- A. No. You'd have to ask the person who operated it when they deployed it.
- Q. And what about the ELSUR operations technician who was responsible for the deployment of this device?
- A. The ELSUR operations technician is not responsible for the deployment of the device.
- Q. They're responsible for setting up the device and providing it to the agent, right?
 - A. No.
- Q. What are they responsible for?
- A. For receiving the device that has the evidence on it, and downloading the evidence.
 - Q. Okay. Who is responsible for preparing the device to be able to go out in the field?
 - A. In most field offices technically trained agents provide technical equipment to case agents to use.
 - O. So the case agent, the person that was



- actually going to provide the device to somebody he was working with, it would be his responsibility to make sure the device was set appropriately?
- A. I can't speak to Albuquerque, what they did or did not do.
- Q. Is that a practice at least in some areas that you're aware of?
- A. Generally, technically trained agents will provide equipment and instruction on the equipment to case agents, yes.
- Q. And then, generally, the case agent would be responsible for preparing the device for deployment?
- A. No. Depends. Some offices rely more on the tech agent to do that. It depends on the office and the scenario.
- Q. So we'd have to talk to somebody from Albuquerque?
- A. Yes.

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- Q. Now, I think you were asked some questions by Mr. Beck about DVD 1D56. And that was the one that showed that the recordings were made on December 30, 1899, and were zero seconds?
 - A. Wrong date and time, obviously.
 - Q. Right. And you're attributing that to the



- 1 clock battery being dead or defective in some manner?
 - A. The clock battery was dead, and that's why it happened.
 - Q. But you've confirmed that there are recordings on that evidentiary DVD?
 - A. Yes. We played one here a minute ago.
 - Q. And I think you acknowledge that at the time that that device was downloaded onto the evidentiary DVD, 1D56, it was apparent from the download that there had some sort of malfunction of the clock system?
 - A. That would be immediately apparent when you were to look at the recorder in USBird.
 - Q. Okay. You testified that that actual ELSUR device was sent back to the vendor. Am I understanding you correctly?
 - A. No. The copy of the evidence was sent to the vendor to see if they could extract any information.
 - Q. So a copy of that DVD was sent to the vendor?
 - A. Yes. A copy was sent to LA field office.

 And the EOT took it to the vendor to examine it.
 - Q. What about the device itself? Was the device itself ever sent back to the vendor to see if



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there was information on that that wasn't transmitted to the DVD?

- A. If the device was not erased, there would still be those sessions on the device. If you erase the device, then there is nothing on the device.
- Q. Okay. So my question is -- and maybe you don't know -- if that device, the actual ELSUR device, was that sent back to the vendor?
- A. There would be no point in doing that, if it was erased. If it was not erased, that would be different.
- Q. Well, do you know if the device, prior to being erased, was sent back to the vendor because --
- A. I don't think it was, no. It was not to my knowledge, no.
- Q. Okay. Are there some sort of -- you're obviously aware that something was sent back to the vendor. Is that a notification that somebody makes to you by phone, or is that something that you find out about through some sort of written communication?
- A. It can be by phone. We usually send an email saying: Would you take something back? But it's phone or email. So the response could be a verbal response; the response could be an email response.

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- 1 Ο. You mean the response from the vendor? This specific time? 2 Α.
- 3 Yes. Ο.

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- Α. I had an email back.
- So there is a record of some sort of Ο. Okav. written communication between you and the vendor regarding this particular evidentiary DVD?
 - It was between my unit and the LA field office's EOT, who contacted the vendor and took the copy of the disc to the vendor.
 - And when the vendor responded, do they just Ο. respond informally in an email, or was there some sort of forensic report generated?
 - I didn't get a response from the vendor. Α. think they spoke directly to LA and I got a response from LA. Actually, my ET got an response from LA.
- 17 What's your ET? Ο.
 - Electronics technician. Α.
 - Q. And, essentially, the response was there is no additional information on the copy of the DVD that was created?
 - There is no way to find date and time from that at all. And all they could say was it was an authentic recording. But there is no metadata showing date and time because the clock battery had



1	failed.
2	Q. And did the vendor ask whether you could
3	provide the original ELSUR device?
4	A. No.
5	(Mr. Adams entered the courtroom.)
6	Q. Apart from this particular DVD recording,
7	or this particular ELSUR device, was anything else
8	sent back to the vendor to ask about missing or
9	incorrect information in connection this case?
L 0	A. No.
L1	Q. So there was just that one DVD?
L 2	A. That was the one DVD we sent back.
L 3	Q. And based on your knowledge, who is
L 4	responsible for informing the operator of the device
L 5	the conditions or how it's to be utilized in the
L 6	field, if anybody?
L 7	A. Technically trained agents have the
L 8	responsibility for teaching the case agents how to
L 9	use the equipment.
20	MS. JACKS: If I could just have a moment?
21	THE COURT: Certainly.
22	MS. SIRIGNANO: Your Honor, good afternoon.
23	THE COURT: Ms. Sirignano.



1	EXAMINATION							
2	BY MS. SIRIGNANO:							
3	Q. Good afternoon, Agent.							
4	Agent, I'd like to talk a little bit about							
5	training first, like Ms. Jacks started out with, and							
6	then go into the device a little bit.							
7	So who did you speak to before you came							
8	here to Las Cruces to prepare for your testimony?							
9	A. Mr. Beck.							
10	Q. Assistant United States Attorney Matt Beck?							
11	A. Yes.							
12	Q. And how many times did you talk with him?							
13	A. Less than a dozen times. In terms of on							
14	the phone formally?							
15	Q. Well, any contact with him.							
16	A. I can't recall. I'd have to go back and							
17	get you that information exactly.							
18	Q. You'd say less than a dozen times?							
19	A. If you include emails, more than a dozen							
20	times.							
21	Q. What was substance of these communication?							
22	A. When to appear, when come out.							
23	Q. Scheduling, or							
24	A. He sent me a copy of what he submitted							
25	today, a rough draft, to share with the attorneys at							



- 1 OTD and myself.
- Q. The motion to reconsider?
- 3 A. Yes, ma'am.
- 4 Q. Did you proofread it?
- 5 A. Not entirely, no.
- 6 Q. Well, did you proofread any of it?
- 7 A. Some of it.
- Q. What did you proofread? What did you
- 9 change?
- 10 A. It referred to -- and again, he already
- 11 corrected it. He had the wrong name or wrong model
- 12 | number of the recorder.
- Q. Wrong model number of what?
- 14 A. The recorder. He had a HAWK3 instead of a
- 15 | HAWK8. It was typo.
- 16 Q. There were two devices in this case, right?
- 17 A. I'm not familiar off the top of my head how
- 18 many devices there were. I know of a HAWK and a
- 19 RAVEN, and I think an EAGLE as well.
- 20 Q. So there could have been three?
- 21 A. I don't know. You'll have to ask the case
- 22 agents.
- 23 O. What was the extent of your review of the
- 24 actual recordings and the devices before you came
- 25 here?



1	A. I didn't view any of the devices.						
2	Q. I was just going to ask you to let me						
3	please try to finish my sentence, because Ms. Bean						
4	here is going to get upset with us if you step over						
5	me a little bit. Okay?						
6	A. Okay.						
7	Q. I'll give as much time as you need to						
8	answer. I just don't want to get Ms. Bean upset with						
9	us.						
10	So you did not review the devices?						
11	A. No, I did not inspect the devices.						
12	Q. Where are these devices?						
13	A. I don't know.						
14	THE COURT: Ms. Sirignano, would this be a						
15	good time for us to take our afternoon break?						
16	MS. SIRIGNANO: It would, Your Honor.						
17	Thank you.						
18	THE COURT: All right. We'll be in recess						
19	for about 15 minutes.						
20	(The Court stood in recess.)						
21	THE COURT: All right. It looks to me like						
22	everybody has got an attorney. Everybody look around						
23	to make sure everybody has got an attorney.						
24	All right. Mr. Adams, you're now here?						
25	MR. ADAMS: I am, Your Honor.						





1	THE COURT: Good afternoon to you,
2	Mr. Adams.
3	Ms. Strickland, I think you walked in.
4	We'll note your appearance.
5	I've been told that Ms. Fox-Young is not
6	going to be on the telephone for the rest of the
7	afternoon.
8	Is there any other adjustments we need to
9	make?
10	MR. CASTLE: Your Honor, this is Jim
11	Castle. I've been on the phone since the hearing
12	began.
13	THE COURT: Oh, okay.
14	MR. CASTLE: I didn't think the Court
15	wanted me to enter my appearance since it wasn't a
16	change from last week.
17	THE COURT: All right. Mr. Castle, good
18	afternoon to you.
19	All right. Mr. Williamson, I'll remind you
20	that you're still under oath.
21	THE WITNESS: Sure.
22	THE COURT: Ms. Sirignano, if you wish to
23	cross-examine Mr. Williamson, you may continue.
24	MS. SIRIGNANO: Thank you, Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: Ms. Sirignano.



- BY MS. SIRIGNANO:
- Q. Agent Williamson, so I believe right before the break I asked you if you reviewed the devices in
- 4 | issue before --

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- A. No, I did not.
- Q. Okay. And then I asked you where these devices are.
- 8 A. I don't know.
- 9 Q. Presumably, they're in the ELSUR storage 10 unit in Albuquerque?
- 11 A. You'd have to ask the Albuquerque office.
- 12 Q. So you're the supervisory Special Agent for nationwide FBI on covert recording devices; correct?
- 14 A. Yes.
- Q. So you have a point of contact in each FBI field division on these devices?
- 17 A. Yes.
- Q. And who is the point of contact for
 Albuquerque's division that you talk with routinely
 about your program and these devices?
- A. It's a technically trained agent, Special Agent Hugo Nanez.
 - O. I'm sorry? Hugh?
- 24 A. Hugo Nanez.
- Q. Hugo N-A-N-E-Z?

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- 1 A. Yes, ma'am.
- Q. So when you were talking with Ms. Jacks
- 3 earlier, he would be the technically trained agent
- 4 | that is in charge of these ELSUR devices maintained
- 5 in Albuquerque; correct?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And what's his staff look like, in the
- 8 ELSUR unit, or in the technically trained agent unit?
- 9 A. I can't tell you. I don't know. You'd
- 10 have to ask Albuquerque.
- 11 Q. You don't have any idea of how many
- 12 personnel are in the Albuquerque covert recording
- 13 | unit?
- 14 A. It's not a covert recording unit.
- 15 Q. What is it?
- 16 A. They're technically trained agents assigned
- 17 to the Albuquerque office.
- 18 Q. How many are in Albuquerque?
- 19 A. I'd have to look it up.
- 20 O. More than five?
- 21 A. Maybe.
- 22 | Q. More than 10?
- A. I don't think so.
- Q. So somewhere between five and 10
- 25 technically trained agents in Albuquerque; correct?



- A. I'd have to look it up.
- Q. But you just said it's less than 10, but more than five, somewhere like that, right?
 - A. Probably.

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- Q. And then, within this technically trained agent group, they work with the ELSUR unit; correct?
 - A. They do.
 - O. And tell us what an ELSUR unit is.
- 9 A. Where is it?
- 10 Q. No. What it is.
- 11 A. It's not a unit, but there are ELSUR

 12 operations technicians assigned to Albuquerque whose

 13 responsibility it is to receive evidence and enter it

 14 into evidentiary storage.
- Q. So it's like an evidence clerk, but just for ELSUR-type evidence; correct?
 - A. They handle all evidence.
 - Q. Recorded evidence or physical evidence?
- A. Again, you'd have to talk specifically to the Albuquerque office. Because every field office is slightly different.
- Q. Slightly different. But what's the MIOG stand for, M-I-O-G, FBI verbiage?
- A. Memory of Investigative Operational
 Guidelines?



Q. Correct. And what is the DIOG?

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- A. I can't recall off the top of my head right now. But there was no talk to this, as far as I know, the specific who is in what room, and what they do.
- Oh, no, I'm not asking specifically about 6 Ο. 7 who is in what room and what they do. I'm trying to 8 get a general overview. Since you are the program manager for all technically trained agents that 9 10 handle the covert recording throughout United States, 11 you can tell us exactly what the MIOG or the DIOG or 12 whatever other policy or procedure document is out 13 there to go over what each technically trained agent 14 and ELSUR clerk has to follow; correct, since you're 15 the supervisor?
 - A. No. I don't know all the things that the ELSUR operations techs have to do. That's not my program.
 - Q. Okay. Where would we find the ELSUR technicians' job description, responsibilities, and what they do?
 - A. What unit in the FBI?
 - Q. Sure. Let's start with that?
 - A. The ELSUR Program Management Unit.
- 25 O. And who is in charge of that?



1	Α.	The	Unit	Chief	is	Kris	Moxley,	Kristen
2	Moxley.							

- O. And she's --
- A. He is Kristen, K-R-I-S-T-E-N, M-O-X-L-E-Y, he's the unit chief for the ELSUR program management unit.
 - Q. And is he in Quantico or D.C.?
- 8 A. Quantico.

- 9 Q. Okay. Thank you.
- And so we've got this ELSUR program. Their responsibilities are outlined in the new DIOG or the MIOG or another policy?
- 13 A. There is the TIP policy.
- Q. Oh. What's the TIP policy?
- 15 A. Technical Investigative Program policy.
- 16 O. When was this written?
- 17 A. I can't recall.
- 18 Q. Is this a public policy?
- 19 A. I don't think so.
- Q. So everyone, an ELSUR clerk, or anybody
 working in the ELSUR unit, would have to abide by the
- 22 | TIP policy; correct?
- 23 A. You'd have to ask EPMU. I don't know.
- Q. EPMU is what?
- 25 A. ELSUR Program Management Unit.



- 1 Ο. Okay. So let's get to your unit. 2 the Supervisory Special Agent. Are you the unit 3 chief? 4 I'm the acting unit chief. Acting unit chief, okay. Of the covert 5 Ο. recording devices unit? The audio surveillance unit. 7 Α. 8 O. Audio surveillance unit. Okay. And how many technically trained agents in 9 10 Albuquerque report to you? Just the one?
- 11 None. Α.

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- 12 They report to Albuquerque division? 0. None.
- 13 Α. Yes.
- And what policy do you abide by in the 14 Ο. 15 audio surveillance unit and in each division across the FBI, including Albuquerque, regarding covert 16 17 recordings?
 - The TIP policy. Α.
- 19 Ο. The TIP policy. Do you have a copy of that 20 policy with you here today?
- 21 Α. No.
- 22 Ο. Why not?
- 23 It's something I don't carry around with me, and I was not asked to bring it. And I don't 24 25 know if I'd be allowed to show it.



- Q. Okay. So since all agents, including yourself, acting unit chief -- maybe we can talk a little bit about this policy and standards, because within the policy are the standards of operating these devices; correct?
 - A. No.

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- O. Where would the standards be?
- A. They are what we follow in accordance with what, how the devices are used and work. It's not something we have written down as a standard how to use the devices, because they're used in so many myriads of ways.
 - O. I don't understand that answer.
- A. When you say how do you use them, I mean we have instruction we give to the technically trained agents. And there is a syllabus of instructions.

 And there is user manuals from the vendor.
- Q. Okay. I'm going to start with the user manuals of the vendor.
 - MS. SIRIGNANO: May I approach, Your Honor?

 THE COURT: You may.
- Q. Agent, I apologize, but I don't have a hard copy of this reg yet. What does this look like to you?
 - A. It looks like a user's manual.



- 1 Q. Which user's manual?
 - A. I don't know.

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- Q. Well, can you read from it, please, sir, the first page?
 - A. USBird HAWK, FALCON, EAGLE8A, model 8 flex 8C audio recorders user's manual, Windows version.
 - Q. So looking at this first page -- and feel free to scroll down, especially down to page 32. What do you think this purports to be?
 - A. A user's manual for the devices.
- 11 Q. Which devices?
- MR. BECK: Your Honor, I'm going to object.
- 13 It's outside the scope and relevance. I don't see
- 14 how this ties back to his testimony on direct.
- THE COURT: What are you trying to --
- 16 explain to me what you're trying to do here, Ms.
- 17 | Siriqnano.
- MS. SIRIGNANO: Well, Your Honor, I believe
- 19 the testimony on direct was that the Government
- 20 | didn't want any of this proprietary information
- 21 | regarding the HAWK and the EAGLE, and the -- I can't
- 22 remember the third device name. And they didn't want
- 23 to provide it to the defense and the defense expert
- 24 | because it's proprietary, and it had national
- 25 security concerns.



But, as you can see, Judge -- and I'll offer a hard copy of this one when Ms. Gilbert comes back and gets me a hard copy. It's the actual user's manual of these devices. And also there is at least one photograph of one of the devices that is here in the public record.

Thank you. Let's do it this way -
THE COURT: Well, I guess at this point,

Mr. Beck, one of the problems I'm having, I'm trying
to figure out what it is they want that they don't

have. So I need to probably give her a little

leeway, because I'm not sure what the ballgame is

right now.

MR. BECK: Yeah. And I agree, I'm not either. I don't know that they asked for a user manual of this device. And we didn't provide one. So, I guess, if they want to put this in the record, it seems to me this would be a little bit more argument than cross-examination of Special Agent Williamson.

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to allow it, because -- and overrule the objection -- because I guess we could have had argument before we had the witness. But it may be that the witness has taken care of a lot of concerns of the defendants. I don't

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know. But anyway, I'll allow it. Overruled.

MS. SIRIGNANO: And, Judge, I might be able to streamline this thing. The reason why I think we're going through this exercise is, you know, how can we learn the person can turn these devices on and off, and whether or not someone can actually break into these devices. And that was the purpose of Ms. Jacks' letter that was filed at Document 1459 on November 20. Really, that's bottom line here.

And I can keep going on until 5:30, as you know. But I'm happy to streamline this thing, if we can get access to it. Get -- Mr. Bly is here. He can take a look at it. The photograph of it is in the public record, as is the user's manual. And so I'm having a very difficult time trying to figure out why the CHSs have had access to it, and the defense cannot at this point.

THE COURT: Well, I guess my sort of reaction to everything is that this looks like a fishing expedition. I'm just not seeing that y'all are pointing out -- the defendants keep pointing out some information, either Brady or Rule 16 or Giglio that they're going to get. It just seems to me it's sort of general discovery. So I guess I'm not inclined to go much further than where we are now.

1	MS. SIRIGNANO: I'll proceed, Your Honor.
2	If you'd like, I can argue about it not being a
3	fishing expedition. I could keep going or I can take
4	some argument now, if you'd like.
5	THE COURT: It's your call. I'm just kind
6	of telling you where I'm leaning right now.
7	MS. SIRIGNANO: I'll proceed, Your Honor.
8	Thank you.
9	May I approach?
10	THE COURT: You may.
11	BY MS. SIRIGNANO:
12	Q. So Agent, does this reflect the digital PDF
13	that I showed you previously?
14	A. It looks to be the same, yes.
15	Q. What did you say it was?
16	A. It says it's a USBird user's manual.
17	Q. And the date of it?
18	A. It says March 2, 2007.
19	MS. SIRIGNANO: Your Honor, I'd like to
20	move to admit Garcia, Chris, Exhibit B at this time?
21	THE COURT: Any objection?
22	MR. BECK: No objection, Your Honor.
23	THE COURT: All right. Defendant Chris
24	Garcia's Exhibit B will be admitted into evidence.
25	Q. And Agent, look at the second page, titled





- 1 Section 6. What is that?
- A. Section 6, it says HAWK. It describes the
- 3 HAWK recorders.
- Q. And is that an actual HAWK recorder on the
- 5 bottom of the page?
- 6 A. It appears to be, yes.
- Q. Consistent with what the FBI was using in this case?
- 9 A. No.
- 10 Q. It's different?
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 O. How so?
- 13 MR. BECK: Objection, Your Honor. I think
- 14 | this is getting into law enforcement sensitive
- 15 | material that I'm going to object to on that basis.
- 16 I've got my marching orders.
- 17 THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Williamson a
- 18 | question: Would you agree with that; that the answer
- 19 here that Ms. Sirignano is requesting is going to
- 20 reveal some confidential information?
- 21 THE WITNESS: It would be information I'd
- 22 rather not share, yes, Your Honor.
- 23 THE COURT: And, Ms. Sirignano, precisely
- 24 | what are you asking here?
- MS. SIRIGNANO: I'm trying to determine



between the device in this photograph, and if there 1 2 is a difference between the FBI device. And I could make the question more specific: Is that the 3 4 configuration of the on and off switch on the device 5 that was used in this case? THE COURT: Is that still confidential 6 information? 7 8 THE WITNESS: No, I can share that information. 9 10 THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any problem 11 with that then, Mr. Beck? 12 I do, Your Honor. And I mean, MR. BECK: 13 you have his answer, so I probably know where you're 14 going to go on this. But my understanding is that's 15 the purpose of holding this hearing, because we're looking for what information the defendants need or 16 17 are entitled to under Rule 16, Brady, or Giglio, and which they don't have provided to them through either 18 19 the facts or what Agent Williamson has already 20 testified to. And so certainly it has an on and off It's probative. We provided that 21 device. 22 information. What the on and off button looks like 23 is not helpful to their defense. It's not Brady, 24 Rule 16, or Giglio. And it's treading upon law 25 enforcement sensitive information. So that we're



having this hearing, I don't think, allows them to 1 2 get into the discovery that we're trying to prevent 3 by having this hearing. 4 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to sustain the 5 objection. And you can make an argument for that 6 information when we get to the argument side. 7 MS. SIRIGNANO: Thank you, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Ms. Sirignano. BY MS. SIRIGNANO: 9 10 Ο. Agent, can you please identify this third 11 page? 12 It says it's an EAGLE8A and describes an Α. 13 EAGLE8A. 14 And you testified earlier that the EAGLE8A Ο. 15 was used in this FBI case as well; correct? 16 I think there was an EAGLE involved. I'd Α. 17 have to check with the case agents to make sure. Was your testimony you thought it was 18 19 involved, earlier, or it was involved? 2.0 My understanding, there was one involved. Α. And is that a picture of the EAGLE8A in 21 Q. 22 Figure 6.2 of this document? 23 Of the type that was used?



Q.

this a picture of the EAGLE8A?

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No, I didn't ask that question. I said is

- A. It is a picture of an EAGLE8A, yes.
- Q. Does law enforcement or the FBI
 specifically have a different user's manual than the
 one I've shown you here today?
 - A. That is dated 2007.
 - Q. It is.

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- A. And that is not a manual that I have or that we use, that I'm familiar with. I might have a copy of it somewhere from a long time ago.
 - O. And your user's manual is dated what?
- 11 A. I'd have to go back and look and see.
- Q. So, ostensibly, there is a later version of the user's manual that I found on the internet?
- 14 A. Are there later ones on the internet?
- Q. No. I asked you -- there is a later user's manual for these three devices?
- 17 A. Yes.
- Q. And you don't know the date of them?
- 19 A. No, I do not.
- Q. But the technology and the graphics should be somewhat similar; correct?
- A. Somewhat similar. The technology, yes, somewhat similar.
- Q. Were you able to review the letter that

 Ms. Jacks wrote and filed to the prosecutors in this



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- A. No.
- Q. You did not review Document 1459?
- 4 A. I'm not familiar with it.
 - Q. What did you review prior to you coming to testify today?
 - A. Specifically, I looked at certain DVDs that were provided to me, and checked the authenticity of them. And I looked very briefly at the motion. But I didn't understand it because I'm not a lawyer.
- 11 Q. Thank you.
- So those DVDs are the ones that you and Mr.
- 13 | Beck talked about earlier; correct?
- 14 A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. So we were provided copies of these recordings.
- 17 May I approach?
- 18 THE COURT: You may.
- Q. Agent, I'm providing you what's been marked
 Garcia, Chris, Exhibit A. Can you take a look at

these screen shots for me. And I'll ask you a couple

- 20 Garcia, Chris, Exhibit A. Can you take a look at
- 22 of questions. Do they look familiar to you?
- A. I'd have to compare them to the screen
- 24 | shots for the actual DVDs. They're the same serial
- 25 numbers.



- Q. Are you saying they are the same serial numbers?
- 3 A. I remember the serial numbers are matched.
- 4 But I'd have to actually look at the screen to
- 5 compare my Bird player to this, to see if they're the
- 6 same.
- 7 MS. SIRIGNANO: Your Honor, may I have a
- 8 moment?
- 9 THE COURT: You may.
- 10 Q. Agent, can you tell us what a 1E number is?
- 11 A. A 1E number?
- 12 O. Yes.
- 13 A. As in evidence?
- 14 O. Yes.
- A. I don't deal with evidence much. It refers
- 16 to the piece of evidence, I think.
- Q. Well, you testified about a 1E56; correct,
- 18 | and a 1E60?
- 19 A. A 1D. I'm sorry, 1D.
- 20 | Q. 1D, as in dog?
- 21 A. 1D, as in dog, yes. I have a copy of 1D55,
- 22 | 56, 58, and 60 here.
- 23 O. Now, do you know if those numbers were
- 24 | numbers that were produced to the defense in the
- 25 | Government production?



- 1 A. I don't know.
- Q. And on the top of that exhibit that I just
- 3 | gave you, in the handwriting, can you see what it
- 4 | says on the tops of those pages?
- 5 A. DVD 14, DVD 15.
- 6 Q. Correct. Going all the way to what?
- 7 A. It goes up to 16, 17, 17 page 2, DVD 19,
- 8 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 24 page 2.
- 9 Q. 24 page 2. And based on that screen shot
- 10 of the program that you looked at earlier, is the 1D
- 11 | number on the front of those, or anywhere on those
- 12 | documents?
- 13 | A. No.
- 14 O. So you specifically referred to 1D55, 56,
- 15 | 58, and 60. And I'm going to refer to DVDs 14
- 16 | through 24 page 2. Is that a yes?
- 17 A. I understand.
- 18 Q. Yes.
- MS. SIRIGNANO: Your Honor, I'd like to the
- 20 move to admit Chris Garcia, I believe that's Exhibit
- 21 A.
- 22 THE COURT: Any objection?
- 23 MR. BECK: No objection, Your Honor.
- 24 THE COURT: All right. Anybody else have
- 25 | an objection? Not hearing any, Chris Garcia's



Exhibit A will be admitted into evidence.

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- Q. Okay. So you specifically talked about the ELSUR clerk downloading these recordings into the software program; correct?
- A. The ELSUR clerks use the USBird software to download the data on the recorder into the original evidence DVD.
 - Q. And the original evidence CD or DVD?
- A. I think it would be a DVD or a CD. It depends upon how large the file is. I think DVDs are used because they contain more information.
- Q. Okay. And this was what you consider the original evidence before the recording device is -- the data is either deleted or it's wiped clean; correct?
- A. The first download from the recorder is the original evidence.
 - Q. Where is that maintained?
- A. It should be maintained in the ELSUR storage room.
 - Q. And the ELSUR clerk would put together the original CD or DVD depending on the size, and then they create the chain of custody form and the identification bar code for each download?
 - A. They would; yes, they would.



- And so this piece of electronic or digital Ο. evidence, the first download is treated just like a blood sample or a firearm or any piece of physical evidence in terms of maintenance of that original evidence; correct?
 - Α. Yes.

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- And what policy do these ELSUR clerks use to maintain this evidence?
 - I don't know. Α.
- What policy do the technically trained 0. agents use to maintain this evidence?
 - They don't. Α.
- Ο. They don't. So I believe your testimony earlier was that the technically trained agents check these devices out; correct?
 - It depends on the field officer. Α.
- 17 And in Albuquerque who checks it out? technically trained agent or the case agent? 18
 - Α. I don't know. You'd have to ask the Albuquerque agents.
- So you're saying here today that you don't know if it was Mr. Acee or one of the technically 23 trained agents that checked any of these devices out for this case? 24
- 25 Α. That's correct.



- Q. And so, presumably, whoever checked out the device would have looked at the device before they checked it out; correct?
 - A. One would presume.

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- Q. It's probably part of the policy; correct?
- A. People who are going to use the device, before they deploy it, should check in USBird to see, make sure it functions, yes.
- Q. Correct, because it's going to be used as evidence one day in trial; correct?
- A. Not the USBird. But it will collect evidence. To make it work -- make sure it works.
- Q. I'm talking about the actual device itself that collects the original evidence. That evidence would eventually be used in court someday?
 - A. What the recorder records would.
 - O. The original evidence.
- 18 A. It was downloaded, yes.
- 19 Q. Okay. So we're on the same page here.
- So either the case agent or the technically trained agent, presumably, pursuant to the FBI's policy, would look at the device before deploying it?
 - A. The agents are trained they should check the devices, or somebody should check the devices before they're deploying them.





- Q. And that's pursuant to the policies that you were talking about, instructions on how to use these devices, the syllabus of the instruction, and the user's manuals; correct?
- A. We teach them in their training how to use the equipment. So the syllabi includes that. The TIP policy doesn't specifically state it. It just says generically who is in charge of the equipment. It doesn't go into that much detail on the TIP policy.
- Q. Okay. And there is a log that each technically trained agent or case agent would have to sign when they check out a specific device; correct?
- A. It would depend upon the field offices and what they're doing.
- Q. Yes, but -- either a digital log or a hard copy log, there has to be an inventory of these devices; correct?
- A. There is an inventory of the devices, that's correct.
- Q. And just like a firearm or any other piece of FBI property, whoever is maintaining these devices, like an ELSUR clerk or a technically trained agent or a unit chief at Quantico, would want to know where their devices are at all times; correct?





- A. We do the best to know where they are, that's correct.
 - Q. Do you maintain logs for your devices?
- 4 A. Yes.

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- Q. And does the Los Angeles division maintain logs for their devices?
 - A. I would presume.
- Q. So you'd also presume that Albuquerque
 would have some kind of log to know where the devices
 are; correct?
- 11 A. I would.
- 12 Q. Yes. Thank you.
- So who sets the date and time on these devices?
- 15 A. It can be anyone who has the USBird

 16 software and the device and the computer to do so.

 17 It could be a tech agent, an ELSUR operations
- Q. And do you know if Mr. Acee here has the ability to get into this software himself?
- 21 A. I don't know.

technician, or a case agent.

- Q. Do you know if he has permission from the ELSUR clerk or the technically trained agent to download or use this original evidence?
- A. I don't know.





Q. So we're presuming that there is a log in Albuquerque to check in and check out a device.

Let's talk a little bit about maintenance records, okay. So intoxilyzers fail, calibration on these devices sometimes fail. Who maintains the maintenance records of these devices?

- A. There is limited quality control records on devices that come through our unit. And then ADS has, when they produce a product, or they repair it, there is some record. But that's the only records I'm aware of.
- Q. So what you're saying is that each division does not have a record of when a device malfunctions or needs maintenance?
 - A. I don't think so.
- Q. So when does a device come out of circulation with the FBI?
- A. When it fails and breaks and they can't fix it, or it's been determined to be obsolete, and it should be decommissioned.
- Q. So if could you look at the exhibit I gave you, and look for DVD 20 -- or just 20, I'm sorry. That's the device that you had talked about earlier that had -- you called it a clock fail or a date and time fail; correct?

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- A. Yes. The clock battery was dead so the clock battery didn't power the clock function.
- Q. Was this device decommissioned based on the failure of the clock after this recording?
 - A. I don't know.
 - Q. Who would be able to tell us that?
- A. I don't think it would be decommissioned.

 8 It would be Albuquerque's technical program.
 - Q. The technical agent that we talked about earlier?
- 11 A. Yes, ma'am.

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- 12 Q. Hugo Nanez?
- A. Yes, ma'am.
- Q. And there was some discussion with the Los
 Angeles electronic operations unit about this
 specific device?
 - A. We contacted Los Angeles Division's ELSUR operations technicians to ask them to take the copy of the disc to ADS to see if they could find any more data that we couldn't see.
- Q. So you presented them with a copy, not the actual device; correct?
 - A. A copy of the evidence, yes.
 - Q. So why was a copy of the original evidence made, and not the actual recording and the device



- that made the digital evidence, why wasn't that given
 to the Los Angeles division?
- 3 A. There was no need.
- 4 Q. Why?

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- A. Because it was identical to the evidence; the copy is identical to the evidence.
 - Q. Well, the evidence itself you said you verified. But it's just a copy --
 - A. I compared the copy, yes.
- Q. I'm sorry, if you could just let me finish
 my question. You verified a copy; correct?
- 12 A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. But the actual data itself regarding the metadata, the date, the time, the hours, the seconds, that could have been on the original recording device; correct?
- A. Not based on what I'm seeing in this CD, this CD.
- Q. But you don't know because you gave them a copy. You don't have the original; correct?
- 21 A. I never had the original.
- 22 Q. Who had the original?
- 23 A. Albuquerque.
- Q. Who in Albuquerque?
- 25 A. I assume the ELSUR operations unit techs.



- 1 Q. You don't know?
- 2 A. No.
- Q. And you don't know who checked it out to verify that the battery was working when it was checked out; correct?
 - A. Are you talking about the recorder now?
- 7 | O. Yes.

- 8 A. No, I don't know.
- 9 Q. You don't know. So did you work in any
 10 field office before you became a Supervisory Special
 11 Agent in Quantico?
- 12 A. I did.
- Q. You were a case agent?
- 14 A. Yes.
- 15 Q. Which division?
- 16 A. Baltimore.
- Q. Baltimore. Okay. So you understand how important, when someone says something to a government informant, that it would be prudent to know the exact date and time of a statement; correct?
- 21 A. Yes.
- Q. And especially someone like my client,

 Mr. Garcia, if he had one of his statements allegedly

 captured by a government informant, when that
- 25 statement was made would be very important in a



conspiracy case; correct?

A. Yes.

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- Q. So can you please tell us, Agent, why that original device was not sent back to Quantico or to ADS to determine exactly that metadata, which is so importantly needed in this case?
- A. We did send a copy of the evidence to ADA, and they could not extract the metadata.
- Q. I'm not talking about a copy. I'm talking about an original piece of evidence or the actual HAWK or the FALCON?
- A. The HAWK wouldn't contain it anymore. It was deleted. And we know that it was the battery that didn't work. So we know it's a battery failure that caused it from the CD that we're seeing, the DVD. And we sent a copy of that to ADS, and they confirmed it was a battery failure. And that's why there is no date and time.
- Q. And who at ADS confirmed the battery failure?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. But you have an email with that information; correct?
 - A. Yes.
- 25 O. Is that something that you could please



- produce to the Government and the Los Angeles

 technician, so it could be given to the defense

 counsel?
 - A. Yes.

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- Q. Thank you.
- Okay. Let's talk a little bit about

 teaching, and teaching technically trained agents and

 case agents.
 - So, when I was back in the FBI, we used to have forms for everything. And so I'd like to know if there was a form that agents fill out when they provide a recording device to a cooperating witness or a cooperator?
- 14 A. You'd have to ask the case agents. I don't 15 know what they did.
- Q. I'm not asking you about what they did.
 I'm asking you if a form exists?
- 18 A. Do you mean a form in which you get consent 19 from someone?
- 20 O. Yes.
- 21 A. There are consent forms that are used, yes.
- Q. What kind of consent form, Agent? Tell us a little bit about it.
- A. I can't recall off the top of my head all the details about it.





I'm not asking you for all the details. 1 Ο. 2 I'm just asking you for a summary of what the form 3 As the unit chief, you would be responsible 4 for teaching every division about these forms; 5 correct? 6 Α. No. You wouldn't? 7 0. Α. 8 No. Who would then? 9 Q. The people who run the training of those 10 Α. 11 agents who run those programs involving those 12 investigative matters. I maintain the equipment. 13 You maintain the equipment, but don't you 14 also have any buy-in on how the equipment is 15 maintained, how the equipment is used, and the 16 policies the unit chiefs out of Quantico and 17 headquarters routinely develop these kinds of lesson plans and syllabi, correct? 18 19 Α. No. 20

Ο. They don't. Okay.

Well, so tell us a little bit about this consent form. It's, arguably, a form between the agent and whoever is using the device, that they consent to the use of this recording device; correct?

> MR. BECK: Objection, compound, Your Honor.



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1 THE COURT: Overruled. 2 MS. SIRIGNANO: I'm sorry, Your Honor. THE COURT: Overruled. 3 4 Α. So you'd have to ask the case agent what he 5 did. I don't know. No, I'm not asking you about what the case 6 7 agent did or didn't do. We'll get a chance with him 8 But I'm asking you what the consent form is 9 all about. You need to have consent in most cases to 10 11 do a covert recording. So you have to get consent of 12 the person who is carrying the recorder. 13 Ο. Consent of the person who is --14 Going to carry the recorder. Α. 15 -- who is going to carry the recorder. Q. 16 Now, as part of that consent form there is 17 also an admonishment, obligations on how to use it; I'm asking about the form. 18 correct? You're asking about the form? 19 Α. 2.0 0. Yes. I can't recall. 21 22 So, as part of your policy in your unit, and in all of the FBI divisions, isn't it basic agent 23



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training that whenever an informant or cooperator is

given something, they have to sign for it, like money

or a recording device?

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- A. In terms of filling out a form, getting consent to use -- to make the recording, yes.
- Q. And there are certain guidelines on how recordings should be made; correct?
 - A. Guidelines meaning written guidelines?
 - Q. Sure. Or oral guidelines?
- A. You would give oral instructions to a source of how to -- what to do with a device.
- Q. Okay. And based on your experience -maybe that was done in this case; maybe it wasn't -what kind of oral guidelines does a case agent
 generally give to a cooperator when they're given one
 of these devices?
 - A. I don't know.
- Q. Generally speaking, and as the head of this unit, what are the general guidelines?
 - A. It depends upon the scenario in which the device is being used.
 - Q. Okay. So let's talk about a scenario in a correctional facility setting. The device is covert. Obviously, there is an on and off switch. Generally speaking, based on your training and experience, what kind of admonition or advice would a case agent give this person?



MR. BECK: Your Honor, I'm going to object 1 2 to the relevance. I think we're getting pretty far 3 afield of Agent Williamson's role in this case and 4 expertise. 5 THE COURT: I'm inclined to agree. Sustained. 6 Agent, do all your trainings and your 7 syllabi have an outline of how these devices should 8 be deployed when --9 10 Α. No. 11 -- when -- in -- okay, let me rephrase the Ο.

12 question then.

So how does a case agent know how to deploy these devices, if the training and the policies don't have a standard as to how to use them?

- Α. The expertise -- the TTA and their expertise.
- So the TTA is involved in each deployment 18 0. 19 then?
- 20 Α. No.

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- So I'll restate the question then. How 21 22 would a case agent know how to deploy these devices, 23 if it's not in the training, it's not in the policy, 24 and the TTA is not present with them?
 - Α. You'd have to use your ingenuity and



1 determine a way to do it. 2 MS. SIRIGNANO: Your Honor, may I have a 3 moment? 4 THE COURT: You may. 5 MS. SIRIGNANO: Pass the witness, Your 6 Honor. 7 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Sirignano. 8 Mr. Lowry, were you up next? 9 MR. LOWRY: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. 10 THE COURT: Mr. Lowry. 11 EXAMINATION 12 BY MR. LOWRY: 13 Ο. Good afternoon, Agent Williamson. 14 Good afternoon, sir. Α. 15 I want to back up a little bit and just Q. talk about the mechanics of this device. You've 16 17 gotten into a lot of technical details about the 18 operation of the program. But I really want to talk about the mechanics of the particular devices. 19 20 There is a lot of conversation in this 21 testimony you just had about -- well, describing the 22 evidence at play in this case. But it's fair to say 23 everything we've looked at today in these charts, 24 they're all copies of the original evidence; isn't



that fair?



1 A. Yes.

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- Q. And the original evidence was destroyed when the device was wiped clean?
 - A. No.
 - Q. Why do you say that?
 - A. The original evidence is the first download from the device when it's transferred to an evidentiary disc. Because that's when the hashing authentication is created from the SHA256.
- 10 Q. Okay. But that download is a copy of what 11 was on the device?
 - A. It's what was on the device with the authentication hashing included.
 - Q. And who validated this -- what you just described as authentication hashing?
 - A. When you first -- the first download from the device, after you make a download, there is a verify button. You click "verify." And it verifies the hash calculation.
 - Q. That's a black box technology that ADS developed?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. So you're taking ADS at its word that
 that's a mirror copy of what was originally on the
 device?

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A. Yes, sir.

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- Q. My question to you is: Who validated their proprietary software so that FBI could be confident that that copy is a true copy of the original?
- A. We tested the devices to make sure they actually performed as designed. You actually have an authentic recording, and you listen to them, and say, yeah, that's an authentic recording.
- Q. But programs like NIST are designed to create validation programs to test computer algorithms; correct?
- 12 A. I'm not familiar with NIST function or role 13 in that regard.
 - Q. But are you aware of FTK reports?
- 15 A. No.
- 16 O. No?
- 17 A. No.
- 18 Q. You don't work with other computer forensic 19 technology?
- 20 A. No, I do not.
- 21 Q. Just ELSUR devices?
- A. The specific devices that are part of technical investigative program are the ones I'm familiar with.
 - Q. Are you aware of this ADS proprietary



software ever being validated by a third party?

A. No.

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- Q. So you're relying completely on their word that it works?
- A. I was not in the FBI or onboard when we first initiated this contract with ADS, so I can't speak to what happened when it first occurred.
- Q. Because when -- earlier on direct with the Government you were talking about comparing the hash values, and you downloaded your own SHA256 program to compare the hash values to what was on the evidence DVDs that were provided; correct?
- A. Yes.
 - Q. But it's fair to say you're comparing hash values of a copy to a hash value of a copy?
 - A. I'm running a hash against the files that contain the recordings. So I'm comparing a new hash calculation made on the original, on those sessions, on those audio recordings.
 - Q. But it's not the original; it's what was downloaded?
 - A. It's a copy of the original that's in the ELSUR storage facility in Albuquerque.
 - Q. And I guess what I'm trying to get at is -I mean, let's back up and ditch the computer lexicon



1 for a second.

If we pretend the original recording was

like a piece of fine art, like the Mona Lisa, and

it's locked up in a secure room. What ADS is telling

you is we can send a master artist in there to make a

copy of that and bring it out of that secure room,

and put it on the table for you use; isn't that what

they're telling you?

- A. Meaning what's transmitted down to download?
 - O. Correct.
- 12 A. Yes.

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- Q. And we're going to keep this safe. We're going to make a copy. We're going to bring it out for you to use; correct?
- 16 A. Yes.
 - Q. And then we'll make a copy of that copy and hand it all around the courtroom, right?
 - A. Well, the copy is given to appropriate personnel, correct.
 - Q. Fair enough. Appropriate personnel.
 - So when would you're doing your hash value comparison, you're comparing a copy that Mr. Beck may have to the copy that I may have in discovery?
 - A. Yes, I can run a hash calculation on the



- 1 copy you have or the copy that Mr. Beck has, any of 2 those.
 - And the original that's in the locked Ο. vault, that's been dispensed with?
 - Α. We can run a hash calculation on that, too.
- If the ELSUR device has been wiped 6 Ο. How? 7 clean?
 - No, the original evidence is sitting in a DVD in the ELSUR storage room.
- 10 0. I don't want to go around the circle too 11 But that was the download of the many times. 12 original?
 - Α. We consider that the original evidence.
 - You consider that the original evidence? Ο.
- 15 Yes. Α.

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- 16 Ο. And that's based on what ADS tells you?
- 17 There is no way to get onto an ADS recorder and listen to it and hear what's on it without 18 19 downloading it.
- 20 And, again, you're taking ADS at its word Ο. that that's a perfect copy of what was there? 21
 - Α. Yes. And through experience.
- 23 I want to talk to you about -- I think what Ms. Sirignano handed you is a Chris Garcia exhibit 24 25 with the spreadsheets on there?

PROFESSIONAL COURT

REPORTING SERVICE



SANTA FE OFFICE

A. Yes, sir.

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- Q. Well, first, let me back up. So let's talk about this actual device, if I can. You mentioned on direct that there is an on/off switch; correct?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. And that's for the person who has been instructed to handle this device to activate?
- A. Ideally, yes.
 - Q. Is there a way this device could accidentally turn off?
- 11 A. If you could accidentally hit the switch 12 and turn it on or turn it off by accident, yes.
- Q. Is there any kind of way somebody handling the device would know that it was on?
 - A. I'm sorry. Say that again?
- Q. Sure. Is there any way the person actually using the device would know that it is on?
- A. If they were instructed what to look for, they could see a light that indicates a recording is going on.
- Q. That is a light that turns green if it's on?
 - A. It flashes when recording is going on.
 - Q. So they would be able to see it flash?
- 25 A. If they knew to look for it.



- Q. So when the device is turned on -- I believe you said on direct that when you turn it on it energizes the microphone?
 - A. Correct.

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- Q. How long does that take to energize the microphone from the time you push the on button?
- A. My understanding is for audio devices it is practically instantaneously.
 - Q. So instantaneous, in your mind?
- A. As fast as electricity powers up the transducers.
- Q. Okay. So if the people that were handling this case in the field were told it took ten seconds to activate the microphone, they would have been misinformed?
 - A. With the audio/video, if video is involved there can be a delay if the camera is activated. It can be a correct instruction. It depends upon the device.
 - Q. But if it was just a device in audio only mode, it would only be -- it would be instantaneous, if I understand you correctly?
 - A. It would be. But I think people might still hear the delay instruction.
 - O. I believe, Agent Williamson, you have



- this -- we've been provided this in a manner that is labeled DVD 15. Can you turn to that real quickly?

 MS. BHALLA: Excuse me, Your Honor. Can you get this one turned on? I'll just move over here, Your Honor.
 - THE COURT: We'll have to get IT up here.

 But I think everybody has positioned themselves so
 they can see it on some screen. So let's go ahead.

 BY MR. LOWRY:
 - Q. Agent Williamson, so if I understand your testimony correctly, this would be a single download from, in this case, I guess a RAVEN2A device?
- 13 A. Yes.

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- Q. Would you do me a favor: Could you tell me the time above the pen?
 - A. On line 6?
- Q. Correct. So how much recording time would we have there, from 1 through 6?
- 19 A. The total number lengths of these together?
- 20 Q. Correct.
- A. It's going to take me a while to add those
- 22 up. I'm not that good at math without a pencil.
- Q. Just give me an approximation, if you will.
- 24 Take your time. You can add them up.
- 25 A. Over 53 minutes, if I'm adding close to it,



- is the total combined of the length between 1 and 6, of the total, if you add all those durations up.
- Q. So you have less than 55 minutes; is that fair?
- A. Yes.

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- Q. Why would the person operating this device tell the FBI handler that they had recorded five to six hours of video, if we can only see less than 55 minutes of video -- I mean audio -- pardon me. I meant audio throughout that.
- 11 A. I don't know.
 - Q. Okay. The person actually handling the device knows when they turned it on; correct?
 - A. Unless they turned it off by mistake.
- Q. But if they turned it off by mistake, they wouldn't see the lights flashing?
 - A. If they knew to look for it.
- Q. Are these individuals handling the devices instructed on how to cut it on or cut it off?
 - A. I don't know what they were instructed.
- Q. Should they have been instructed how to cut it on and cut it off?
- A. One would think you'd need to know that to deploy it.
 - O. So if you think that person needed to know



that to deploy it, then that person thought that they deployed it for five or six hours, do you have any reason to think -- well, why would we only see less than 55 minutes?

A. I don't know.

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Q. And I wanted to bring your attention to -I'm going to go over this briefly, because I'm not
quite sure I understood it earlier.

There is a green flag. You can't tell on this copy because it's a black and white copy. But this green flag on line 21 -- and feel free to pull it up on your digital device.

- A. No. I would agree, it's a green flag, given that the end time is 23:25 hours and 52 seconds and the start time is the same for the next session.
- Q. And I'm still a little confused. Why would that recording 21 click off at 4 minutes and 45 seconds, when you look at DVD 17 that's part of that same exhibit, and all of these are green flags, and you see the run time is typically over an hour on DVD 17?
 - A. I don't know.
- Q. So if I understand the green flag correctly, that's for when the device senses it's going to be a lengthy recording?



- A. It's supposed to create a new session when it detects that the amount of data exceeds the amount that can fit onto an evidentiary disc.
- Q. Okay. So I mean, I'm taking it that the device, while it's a highly technical device is not clairvoyant, it can't predict the future; am I correct?
 - A. Yes.

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- Q. So what's the data limit that would cause
 DVD 15 line 21 to cut off at four minutes, but on DVD
 17 you have run times of over two hours?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. As the national leader, I assume you're assigned to understanding how the ADS program works with their proprietary software?
- A. I don't know how the proprietary software works. That's proprietary.
- Q. Is there a data limit in kilobytes or megabytes or gigabytes that you have to reach before you hit a green flag and it terminates?
- A. My understanding, it changes from recorder to recorder. In order to make the assessment you're asking, I'd have to actually get the actual recorder and have ADS take a look at it and give us an answer.
 - O. But on DVD 15 and DVD 17, we're both



talking about a RAVEN2A device; correct?

A. Yes.

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- Q. And as we sit here before this Court, you can't tell us why one would transition at a little under 5 minutes and the other would transition after two hours?
- A. Assuming it worked according to the way it's supposed to work, it's based on data. So the time involved doesn't reflect data. Do you understand what I'm saying?
 - Q. No. Help me out there.
- A. You could have a recorder going on for an hour, and it be quiet, and there is very little data hitting the microphone transducers, so there is very little data being compiled on the recorder. Or you can be in a noisy environment, having a lot of data hitting the microphone and recording a lot of data.
- Q. How do you measure that type of data that's hitting I believe -- what did you say? The transducer?
- A. The microphone has a device that takes the sound and converts it the electrical impulses into a transducer. I don't know, to answer your question.
- Q. Just another -- this is DVD 20 out of that same series of this exhibit. And would you agree



- with me that if we look down at line 13, we have a red flag at line 13, which I've highlighted here?
- A. I would have to look on my screen to see if it's red.
 - O. Absolutely. Help yourself.
- 6 A. Yes, line 13 is a red flag.
 - Q. You explained to this Court why, at line 13 and the red flag for everybody in the room means that it's a low battery?
- 10 A. Correct.

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- Q. And it means that that recording at the end of line 13 ended with a low battery?
- 13 A. That's correct.
- Q. Can you explain to us then why -- how the battery would have been recharged through lines 14 through 23?
- 17 A. It wasn't recharged.
- Q. That's my point. If we have a low battery
 at line 13, and the device has not been recharged,
 why don't we have the red flag throughout rest of it?
- A. Because you don't recharge batteries in
- 22 RAVEN2A. You replace them.
- Q. Okay. So do you think the batteries were replaced?
- 25 A. Yes.



- Q. And that would have been by the user?
- A. I don't know who replaced it, but someone replaced it.
 - Q. And I would assume that you don't know what the users in this case, who was in charge of replacing batteries?
 - A. That's correct.

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- Q. If I understood your affidavit correctly, there are two types of batteries in the devices, a lithium battery and maybe a regular battery?
- 11 A. Well, most of the batteries used are moving
 12 to lithium, so both would probably be lithium
 13 battery.
 - Q. Okay. A lithium battery for the device and a lithium battery for the clock?
 - A. Probably, yes.

things like that.

- Q. And you're saying "probably" --
- A. You can buy nonlithium batteries that will configure and fit into those devices. So you wouldn't be required to use a lithium battery. But there are generic batteries that are sold commercially, like AAA batteries, AA batteries,
- Q. Agent Williamson, back to DVD 15 briefly.

25 Can you sit here looking at this spreadsheet and tell



1	us each time a session ended whether that was
2	intentional or accidental?
3	A. No.
4	MR. LOWRY: No further questions, Your
5	Honor.
6	THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lowry.
7	Any other defendant have questions of Mr.
8	Williamson?
9	All right. Mr. Beck, do you have redirect
10	of Mr. Williamson?
11	MR. BECK: No, Your Honor.
12	THE COURT: All right. Mr. Williamson, you
13	may step down. Is there any reason that Mr.
14	Williamson cannot be excused from the proceedings?
15	Mr. Beck, can he be excused?
16	MR. BECK: Yes, he may, Your Honor.
17	MS. SIRIGNANO: No, Your Honor.
18	THE COURT: All right. Not hearing anybody
19	say that he can't be excused, you're excused from the
20	proceedings. Thank you for your testimony.
21	THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.
22	THE COURT: All right. Mr. Beck, does the
23	Government have further witnesses or evidence it
24	wishes to present?
25	MR. BECK: No, Your Honor.



THE COURT: All right. Do the defendants 1 2 wish to present any evidence? 3 MS. SIRIGNANO: No, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Beck, if you 5 wish to argue in support of your motion. MR. BECK: So, Your Honor, with today's 6 testimony, the defendants have the information to 7 8 which they would be entitled under Rule 16, under Brady, under Giglio, and more information than that. 9 I think the only information that they 10 11 don't have at this point are sort of the dimensions 12 of the recorder and to be able to inspect the 13 recorder, which --14 THE COURT: You know, this is probably a 15 question that's more appropriate to the defendants, 16 but do you understand what it is they're trying to 17 get from that remaining information that you're withholding? 18 19 MR. BECK: I think so. I think what they 20 were intending to look at -- I mean, we can trace 21 back and see how this was a train wreck on our 22 behalf, the United States' behalf. We did not do a 23 good job of educating ourselves and the Court in what 24 happened here. I think what they were looking for 25 was the metadata to understand. First of all, we



didn't know there was metadata. Then we found out there was metadata.

And I think what the defendants were looking for in accessing the devices is -- I think what Ms. Jacks was explaining to the Court in November, early November hearings, was that she wanted her forensic computer expert or a forensic expert to analyze these devices and go back and see whether there is any trace metadata on these devices when they're deleted. There is not. And that is what the hash values and the procedures in place tell us, is that, as he testified, once you download it, the devices are wiped clean. So once you have a disc, you have everything that was off of that. That is the evidence. And the discs are wiped clean.

And there is a reason for that. If we go back to what Mr. Lowry was saying here about the Mona Lisa, that Mona Lisa hangs in a vault or a chamber somewhere, and all we see is the picture. If we're having a court hearing or a trial that involves the Mona Lisa, the Court doesn't require the Mona Lisa to be produced in court. A picture that is authenticated by saying that's how it appeared that day, that's how it looks to me, is sufficient. And the reason why, is because you could have someone

come in, and you could look at the Mona Lisa, and someone who is educated on the Mona Lisa could say:
That's now exactly how da Vinci painted that smile;
that is not an authentic reproduction of what the
Mona Lisa is.

You can do that same thing here through the hash values. So we're not taking ADS's word for it. We're not taking his word for it. There is a procedure in place, with hash values, that makes sure what was on there is authentically reproduced and not modified in any way.

And I would -- and, as an example, I would show the Court the modifications to Rule 902 for authentication that came into effect at the beginning of this month, December 1st. And you can now have self-authenticating evidence, certified data copied from an electronic device, storage medium, or file. I expect that the Court will see a certification like this in this case that gives some of the same data here. And so what it allows for is you have a certificate of a qualified person that complies with the certification requirements of 902 (11) or (12).

So, in this case, what would happen is an expert who has verified the data in the exact same way that Special Agent Williamson did, writes out in



a certificate all of the things by affidavit that he did to certify this. And so, again, if we're looking here at 902(14), that's Rule 902 evidence that is self-authenticating.

And if we go here, this is the committee commentary to the 2017 amendments. Paragraph 14, the second paragraph in there talks about authentication for hash value; that the Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, that the courts recognize that the process that ADS put in place to authenticate the data that was on the ELSUR, or in this case HAWK and other ADS storage devices, the way in which the hash values were obtained, and the way in which they were assigned authenticates the evidence as same as the original.

And so that's why the defendant have all the information that may be helpful or may be useful to them, is through this hashing that was contained on the evidentiary DVD that was copied, and then provided to the defendants to look at their DVDs, provides them everything they wanted in the same form as the original.

So the way in which an expert on da Vinci would come in and say that smile is different, is the same way in which this hash value, if those files

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were ever modified -- which they can't be -- but if they ever were, the hash value that Special Agent Williamson showed to the Court there, the long string of numbers where we looked at the first and the second, they would be completely different from each other. And that's how we can authenticate digital evidence in court. We look at the hash values that were assigned when that recorder was downloaded, the hash values on the evidentiary DVD, the hash values on the copies of the DVDs that he had today and that the defendants have contain the exact same hash value showing that it is identical to the original.

Now, so that the three DVDs that we played at the end are the three DVDs in which the metadata, as I said -- and as Special Agent Williamson pointed out -- the metadata does not match up with the real world.

And so in the case of the DVD with the 1899 dates, the battery died, and so all the date contained in those files is authentic; it's exactly what was on the device. It just doesn't -- it just -- when you play it through the player, it doesn't correspond with real dates and times. But it is the same exact data that was created when the user hit the on and off button.

The same thing for the second and third,
although a little bit different, the third and fourth
that I played. Those, there was something in the
process so that the internal computer for the devices
did not match up with the actual dates and times.
And the way in which that was discovered is by
looking at either when these devices were deployed
out into the field or when these conversations took
place accordingly, and that there was no recorder in
the jails during those dates or the source recording
wasn't placed next to the person who he was recording
in those cases. So in that case, again, even though
that data is inaccurate in terms of real world data,
nothing would be gained, even if that information
were still on the device, which it weren't, because
that's just the coding.

If -- there is no way to manipulate the date, as Special Agent Williamson testified, there is no rewind button. There is no way to manipulate this data. But if you did, again, the hash values would be different, and it would not -- the proprietary ADS software wouldn't read the information.

So I think that's why I was hoping that Special Agent Williamson's testimony would make clear -- and it think that it did -- that no helpful

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or useful information will be gained from inspecting
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     the devices, from allowing access to the devices.
     The hash values are in place, they are an accepted
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     method of authenticating the original, and there is a
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     reason why.
               So if we look at the law, the same law
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     enforcement privilege applies as would apply in
               And what I looked at in the case law and
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     Roviaro.
     what they looked for is that basically there is a
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     compelling need to have access to this law
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     enforcement sensitive information.
                                         And the
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     defendants cannot establish they have a compelling
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     need for the devices or for access to the devices,
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     because nothing would be gained from accessing the
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     devices, nothing helpful.
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               THE COURT: All right. Anything further,
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     Mr. Beck?
                          Not at this time, Your Honor.
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               MR. BECK:
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               THE COURT:
                           Thank you, Mr. Beck.
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               Who wants to take the lead here? I'll kind
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     of go in the order of the examination. Do you want
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     Mr. Lowry to go first?
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               MS. JACKS: I think Mr. Lowry would like to
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     go first, if the Court doesn't mind.
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               THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lowry.
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MR. LOWRY: If the Court would indulge me, Your Honor. I just wanted to speak briefly. And I understand the Court's concern is: What do we need that we don't have, if I understood the Court correctly.

And I think the very last question that Agent Williamson answered is exactly why, on behalf Mr. Baca, we would like to examine this device. The real issue here is, for Defendant Baca, is how easy was it for Mr. Duran to manipulate this device?

Mr. Duran tells Mr. Acee in the text that he provided five to six hours of his recordings of Mr. Baca. But, as you heard Mr. Williamson say, that the DVD provided has less than 55 minutes. There is an open question that you pose, is there no way to tell from this metadata that was provided, if the recording sessions were inadvertently cut off or intentionally cut off. And I didn't get the sense from him how easy it was to inadvertently switch on or off the device, which is, frankly, why we want to It's less about the metadata, and for Team see it. Baca, I would say, it's almost not about the metadata, but it's about how easy it is to manipulate this device. And when I say "manipulate" I mean turn it on or off. And it's really critical for us to

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know is it turned off so easily that it happens, you know, just by happenstance?

So there is a whole bunch of actually technical, mechanical questions that one would want to get from looking at the device: Like how much pressure do you have to apply to the button to actually turn it off? How bright or luminescent is this light that's on flashing when your device is on compared to when it's off? Whether anybody normally using this device knows it's on, knows it's off? Especially somebody, as in this case who is given this device and tasked with recording other individuals in the prison. You would think that they would be acutely aware of whether the device was on Because that, in the words of Eric Duran, or not. was his quote "mission," was to record Mr. Baca.

So I find it a little bit disconcerting that the Special Agent testified that he didn't know whether it was an intentional log off or not. And that's something we need to explore. And the only way we can explore that is to examine the device. So I would say that's the primary reason we would like to look at it, Your Honor, so we could understand that fully. It's a critical part of our defense, because there is a big difference between five or six



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hours of recordings and less than 55 minutes of recording.

But moving to the metadata -- and I'm going to have to research this authentication element under federal Rule 902 -- but it concerns me a great deal that we're just taking ADS's word at face value.

Mr. Beck took me up on the Mona Lisa example, but let me play with that for a second. We all know what Mona Lisa looks like, but let's say we have a Jason Pollack painting locked up in the vault, and I'm coming out and saying, Hey, well, here's the one I have in the vault. If nobody really knows what's in the vault, and we're all talking about copies, that's the question.

And it bothers me a great deal that this process, this proprietary software has never been vetted or validated by any independent agency, and we're taking it at face value that it is what it purports to be.

And I'm sure the Government's confident and at ease with a certification of authenticity. But my question is a little bit broader than that, and perhaps, delves more on a real technical validation issue maybe under Daubert. But we weren't aware that there is a Daubert issue until we saw this affidavit.

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But I'm familiar with DNA evidence and those kind of things, and those types of black box technologies, whether you're talking about breathalyzers or electropherograms or the STRmix data, which you also hear about in this case later on. The people that develop these types of software open it up for the FBI, and even independent organizations to view it and validate it, to make sure it is what it purports to be, a valid technique to record and then download correctly.

And so, again, for Mr. Baca, I'm not saying metadata is of no concern whatsoever, but our primary concern is really about the mechanics of this device:
How does it cut on? How does it cut off? And is it accidental or not? And I think that's a critical part of the case. And I think that's something we don't get from looking at the metadata, and unfortunately, it not even something we get from looking at a picture of a device. You'd actually have to handle it to understand how the buttons function and how it cuts on and off, and whether it can be accidentally turned on and accidentally turned off, or whether it's damn near impossible.

And if you have any other questions, Your Honor, I'd be happy to answer them.





THE COURT: Do you disagree with Mr. Beck that the standard here to overcome this privilege is that the defendants have to show a compelling need?

MR. LOWRY: I think -- yes, I would agree that it's a compelling need. And I would think that based on what I've just argued to you that we have a compelling need to access the device.

One thing the United States hasn't told you, Your Honor -- and I'd be remiss if I did not -is that the Seventh Circuit in the United States of America versus Vernon Chapman -- and I don't have a Westlaw cite, but it's appeal numbers 14-3311 and 14-3363, and this is an October 2015 Seventh Circuit opinion, ordered the FBI to disclose a HAWK device not once, but twice to two different experts for forensic review. So you wouldn't be taking the first step on to the playing field. And this is an opinion by Circuit Judge Bauer, joined by Williams and And they -- again, the district court in Hamilton. this case had ordered this HAWK device disclosed to two independent experts to evaluate it. So it's not as if compelling needs cannot be shown under any circumstances.

THE COURT: What were the compelling needs in that case?



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MR. LOWRY: It was whether -- sort of what we're talking about here -- they thought that the recording had been tampered with, Your Honor, and so they turned it over to experts to see if it had. And I perused the opinion. The experts actually determined that it had not; that the recordings were -- the integrity of the recordings had been maintained. But the point being is that once the need was there, the judge gave them not one, but two bites at the apple, to prove their case. And they didn't, and the recordings came in. But the point being is that there was a compelling need demonstrated by the defense, and the judge gave them that opportunity.

And I'd be remiss again to say that it strikes me -- and I noted in the Government's brief that the United States claims that they have the prerogative to disclose these devices to whoever they want, whenever they would like. And they have to say that because they have to justify having given this device to someone like Eric Duran, who not only was convicted of murder, but we know has both in the past fled from the police and caused significant harm to law enforcement in refusing to obey lawful orders of police officers, where they had to discharge their

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firearms to try to apprehend him.

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And it strikes me as a bit odd that the protective orders of this Court with a former FBI agent can't review this device, if there is somehow a security risk to the United States when you have somebody who, as we speak in this courthouse, is a fugitive from justice, who knows everything about this device. To think that -- and maybe it is the United States' prerogative, Your Honor, about who they let see these. But there is also a balancing test that this Court can entertain, to see whether the defendants have met a compelling need to get access to the device, and inform Mr. Baca getting access to the device is imperative, so we can know, if and when Mr. Duran ever shows up, whether he was turning on this device intentionally and willfully, or accidentally. And it goes to his credibility. It goes to the reliability of the recordings. It goes to Mr. Baca's defense about these recordings being manipulated at his will.

So, Your Honor, I would ask the Court to order the production of the device so our expert could examine it under a very strict and robust protective order, frankly.

THE COURT: Let me do this. I've got some



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more questions I want to ask you, and I don't want to
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     rush anything. But I do need to give Ms. Bean a
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             So why don't we take about a 15-minute break,
    break.
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     and we'll come back in and go about an hour.
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               All right. We'll be in recess for about 15
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     minutes.
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               (The Court stood in recess.)
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               THE COURT: All right.
                                       It looks like
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     everybody has an attorney. Look around the room,
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     make sure everyone has an attorney.
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               All right. Mr. Lowry, if you wish to
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     continue your argument.
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               MR. LOWRY: Well, Your Honor, I think I had
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     finished. I was standing for the Court's questions,
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     if you had any.
               THE COURT: If I understand, all we're down
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     to, pretty much with Mr. Baca, is that you want
     somebody to be able to press the button and see how
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    hard or how easy it is to record. Is that what we're
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     down to?
               MR. LOWRY: Well, that, and whether, based
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     on the illumination of the lights on the device,
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     whether you would know if it's in active recording
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     mode, or whether -- suppose Mr. Duran goes to
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     activate the device and thinks he's recording a
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conversation, he could say, Oh, I missed that part because I saw the light wasn't flashing, so I had to go back and cut it on. I mean, without knowing how the device is illuminated, in tandem with the buttons, we're at a loss to explain why the person holding the device, employing the device, would or would not know it was on or off at a given moment. And that's imperative to our defense, Your Honor. And I can't overstate.

I would just point out for the record -and I believe in the briefing and in the discovery,
that the Government indicated that Mr. Duran had two
different devices, but based on the Garcia exhibit,
he had three different devices. He had a RAVEN
device, a HAWK device, and an EAGLE device. But, I
mean, that's just a little tidbit.

But the real point for us, Your Honor, is exactly what I've been talking about is the mechanics of the device. Would the person holding the device, using the device, know it was on, and would they know it was off? And that sounds really simple. And in theory it is. But in practical application, it's imperative that we know exactly how it functioned so we can be prepared at trial to defend against a claim that, Oh, it was an accidental turn off, it just -- I



dropped it and it cut off, or whatever. I can't even begin to anticipate what the testimony will be. But we need to be prepared for any kind of testimony that the thing randomly cut on and off. And the only way we can defend against that is to actually look at the device.

I would, you know, analogize it to the trigger pull on a weapon. I'm not a firearms person. But I think people that are into firearms are all about how much pounds it takes to pull the trigger. So, essentially, that's what I want to do with this device. I need to know how much pressure it takes to cut off. Does it cut on accidentally, or is it only intentionally? And when you intentionally cut it on, is it apparent it's on by a glowing bright green, is it glowing red? I don't know. I've never seen it.

THE COURT: Well, why not just ask those questions of Mr. Williamson?

MR. LOWRY: Well, I mean, in fairness, Your Honor -- I mean, it strikes me -- again, I want to come back to this idea that, I guess part of my role as a criminal defense attorney is I'm a natural born skeptic. And I want to handle the device myself rather than take the word of an agency who is trying to prosecute my client and put him in prison for the

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     rest of his life. I hope Your Honor would
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     understand --
                           Then that sounds very much
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               THE COURT:
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     you're just like fishing for evidence.
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               MR. LOWRY:
                          No, I'm not. I'm telling you
     exactly why I want it. It's not a fishing --
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               THE COURT: But you've got a witness on the
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     stand that can answer the lights issue, and tell you
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    how hard it is. I mean, you know, that's just
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     fishing after that, to see if you can come up some --
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     you know, play with it and come up with your own
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     theory.
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               MR. LOWRY: No, I mean, I think I need to
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    know -- I mean, one of the things we can do, if we
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     went in is actually measure the illumination, the
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     lumens that the thing gives off. So would an
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     ordinary person be aware, based on the lights, that
     it's on or off? I mean, you're asking us -- it's not
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     a fishing expedition. I'm telling you exactly what I
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     want out of this device, in terms of the pressure --
               THE COURT: But you're just fishing to see
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     if something turns up.
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               MR. LOWRY:
                           No.
                           There is no evidence that
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               THE COURT:
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     anything is wrong with the device, or that it doesn't
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     work as intended.
               MR. LOWRY: Well, it didn't work as
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     intended, Your Honor. I mean, we're looking at a
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     bunch of data that's a bunch of goose eggs. And they
    had to come in and explain why it didn't work as
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                So I hesitate to agree with Your Honor
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     intended.
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     that the thing worked as intended. I mean, if we
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     look at some of the data sheets, there is no data.
     It's everybody's guess, if you look at DVD 20, I
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    believe it is, they all say zero minutes of
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     recording, and the same date and time.
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               But it's really not a fishing expedition,
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     Your Honor.
                  I mean, we're looking for the pressure
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     it takes to turn on the button, the illumination in
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     terms of lumens for the device, the lights on the
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     device.
              I mean, it's concrete information that we
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     want. We know it exists. We just want to measure
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     it.
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               THE COURT:
                           All right.
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               MR. LOWRY: And I don't think Mr.
     Williamson would know. If we want to put him back on
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22
     the stand, we could ask him, but I don't think he
23
    knows that information.
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               THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr.
25
     Lowry.
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1 Anyone else? Ms. Sirignano? 2 MS. SIRIGNANO: Your Honor, I've just 3 passed you the Exhibit A and B, which was entered in 4 today as evidence. And what Mr. Lowry referred to is 5 on Exhibit B. And on the top is DVD number 20, which has the problems with the metadata. And I'd just 6 like the Court to look at that and the different 7 8 devices that --THE COURT: Which one? B? 9 10 MS. SIRIGNANO: B, Your Honor, yes. 11 And with all due respect, Your Honor -- and 12 very respectfully -- I did try and ask the agent 13 about the device. And I was shut down because of 14 some alleged national security or proprietary 15 argument privilege. 16 And I was prepared to go through every 17 feature on that HAWK device, which is -- the pictures are in Exhibit A -- and unfortunately, I wasn't 18 19 allowed to do that. So, as you can see, the 20 Government's argument about this information being national security privileged, it fails terribly. 21 22 It's all over the internet. And while it might be 23 proprietary in nature, it's over the internet, it's 24 on YouTube. 25 And although that manual is 2007, which



came into evidence -- there might be a newer one -but for all intents and purposes I would have liked
to have asked if the buttons were the same. But this
witness wouldn't give us an answer, nor was I allowed
to go into the specifications of the device.

Honor. I do believe there is a compelling need. And this is definitely not a fishing expedition. You heard the Government's witness admit to the dates in these devices; that some of them are bogus. And I did elicit on cross-examination that the dates and times and seconds of these recording devices is very compelling, it's very important to establish in this case the conspiracy statements, co-conspirator statements. The date and the time is very important for all of us. As these recordings, either they pre-dated conspiracy or they post-dated the conspiracy.

And as you can see, to use Mr. Lowry's language, in DVD number 20, there is a bunch of goose eggs there, Your Honor, all zeros.

And what we couldn't hear from this witness was what data integrity checks were done, either at the time that the device was taken out of the ELSUR room or, at the time that the ELSUR clerk downloaded

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this information. And arguably, if there was problem downloading this information, then it should have been stopped. And the original recording on the device itself should have been sent to Los Angeles, and not a copy. That's not the best evidence. The best evidence is not a duplicate. I think it's pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 10002 and 1001 is where it's defined. So I think we have shown a compelling need.

Additionally, with the testimony that the Government's main snitch said that he had five to six hours of recordings, and we only see 53 minutes here -- and, Your Honor, if you go through each entry, each session time, you can see where one flips over at the end of the recording and it starts at the exact same time with a second session. That would be a proper recording, one session goes into a second session, depending on the device. But then you'll also see other sessions that, for whatever reason, only go for a few seconds.

And it also came out in the testimony of the handler's ability to start a conversation and to stop a conversation instantaneously.

So I would just submit, Your Honor, that we have shown a compelling need. This national security

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argument fails. And all we're asking for is to have one attorney and our expert, Mr. Bryan, be able to look at this recording and to ascertain the problems with this metadata that does exist and the data integrity issues that we uncovered today.

Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Well, are you where Mr. Lowry is? You primarily want to touch the off and on device, look at the lights. And the metadata, it is what it is, and there is not much more to be mined there.

MS. SIRIGNANO: Well, I am with Mr. Lowry on actually viewing the device, the on and off switch, and the light issue. But with the metadata, I agree with the Court, that it's either there or it's not there. But we don't have any testimony from the FBI about what they did with the data. And he said he verified it, but he didn't explain how. And they're just taking the proprietary software and the program that was developed for not just the FBI; it seems for other law enforcement agencies. And in making the copy of the original recording, the original recording stays with the device, and what the FBI is calling the evidentiary copy. But, Your Honor, I submit it's a copy. And without that

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original device, it's very hard to -- it's impossible 1 2 to make sure that the integrity of the data exists, 3 or still exists. THE COURT: But what is -- what more is to 4 I mean, that's kind of a legal argument, 5 be done? But there is nothing really more as far as 6 isn't it? 7 tests or anything that can be done on the metadata 8 side, is there? 9 MS. SIRIGNANO: Yes, the Chapman case --10 and I reviewed it briefly -- there were a couple of 11 experts that reviewed that date. And Mr. Bryan, if 12 he was able to get access to the original copy, what 13 they're calling the original evidence, he might --14 well, he can look at that data to see if there was 15 any manipulation other than the on and off switch. 16 THE COURT: But if I understood the 17 testimony, there is nothing on the recording device 18 now. 19 MS. SIRIGNANO: Well, that's what I 20 understand, Your Honor. So the copy, the original copy -- which we don't have -- it's in FBI's evidence 21 22 vault somewhere -- we were given copies of copies. 23 So what I would like to look at with Mr. 24 Bryan is the original copy, to see if there is any



anomalies or any manipulation.

1	THE COURT: So that doesn't have anything
2	to do with the device. That's just you're wanting to
3	see, I guess, whether the copy, your copy, is the
4	same as the copy of the original?
5	MS. SIRIGNANO: Yes, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: So that doesn't have anything
7	to do with the device?
8	MS. SIRIGNANO: Not the device itself,
9	since the FBI destroyed that evidence.
10	THE COURT: So the metadata is just limited
11	now to a copy issue, not to the recording device
12	anymore?
13	MS. SIRIGNANO: Except for disc number 20,
14	which we were told that never the metadata was
15	never captured because of a battery issue.
16	THE COURT: But we can't do anything on
17	that at this point, right?
18	MS. SIRIGNANO: Not at this point, Your
19	Honor.
20	THE COURT: All right. So if I understand
21	where you and Mr. Lowry are, in combination, it's the
22	on and off switch; it's the lights; and you want to
23	look, now, at the original disc to see if it's the
24	same as the copies you're getting?
25	MS. SIRIGNANO: Yes, Your Honor. Thank



138

1 you. 2 THE COURT: So I have the universe, and 3 that's it? 4 MS. SIRIGNANO: You do. 5 Thank you, Ms. Sirignano. THE COURT: 6 MS. SIRIGNANO: Thank you. 7 THE COURT: Anyone else want to arque? Ms. Jacks? 8 9 MS. JACKS: I have a few comments, because 10 I mean, this has been sort of a moving target. I 11 think, when we first started, we were requesting the 12 metadata, because we were saying to the Government: 13 How can you have recordings that you don't know what 14 date they were made, if you're saving the metadata? 15 How can you have recordings that show up as having 16 nothing in them, and they have minutes of recordings, 17 you know, in these files? How can you have recordings that are supposedly made in 1899? 18 19 those were the questions that were raised by the 20 Government's evidence, and why we were saying, look, we need metadata. 21 22 And I join the Court in complimenting Mr. 23 Beck to getting some of the answers to those questions. And I thought he did a good job in 24 25 briefing, or in setting out and honing in on the



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issues here. And I think what the Government's answer has been, Well, how that can happen is the device malfunctioned, or the person that set up the device sent it out the door of the FBI in Albuquerque without the right date setting, or -- and I think we've also heard -- and the Government has answered the questions about how they know when a date, for example, on that Exhibit B, that you have before you, if you look at the one labeled DVD 17 -- I'm sorry, DVD 19 -- this is a summary of recordings that were allegedly made by Billy Cordova with Rudy Perez. these purport to have dates on there. I mean, it's not like you get a date of 1899. These purport to be recorded between February 1st and February 4th.

And what the Government has determined, apparently, that -- this is what I understood through these hearings, and ultimately today -- is that those dates are wrong, and they're wrong because either the device wasn't introduced into the facility on those dates, or because Mr. Cordova wasn't housed next to Mr. Perez on those dates. You wouldn't know that by looking at it. By looking at it, it looks like it's purporting to tell you about recordings that happened on February 1st, 2nd, and 4th.

So my point -- I quess what I'm saying is I



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think the Government has answered our questions. And I think what we're hearing is that there were various errors, some mechanical and some human caused, that produced this confusing data set that we've been trying to make sense of. And for that, I think we understand where we need to go.

I think Mr. Beck and his expert have made it clear that these ELSUR devices, once the data is downloaded off them, whether it downloads correctly or incorrectly, or whether the download is accurate, the device is simply wiped clean and never further examined. So I don't think there is anything that we can gain by looking at the actual ELSUR devices, looking at the metadata on the ELSUR devices. I think the Court is right, that's long gone. And any effort to inquire about the integrity of that or whether there is data on the device that wasn't downloaded onto the DVD, that opportunity was missed when the Government just erased the devices and moved forward.

With respect to Mr. Lowry's comments, I join in his request to examine the devices. And I can only sit here and run through in my mind the various excuses that Mr. Duran or Mr. Cordova or other government informants are going to come up with



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when they're challenged about: Why are you turning this thing off and on and off and on multiple times during a very short time period? And certainly, mistake or accident, or the thing shut off, you know, when I set it down, those are the types of, I think, excuses that are going to be offered up here in court to explain this very unusual manner of recording a conversation.

I note, in looking at the Government's evidence -- and I think the Court can see that in examining Exhibit B -- there are three separate types of electronic surveillance devices that were used in this investigation. And it looks like some of the informants used the same device, and some of the informants used multiple devices, depending on which one was introduced into the prison at which point in time. So I think, to be fair, or to be clear about Mr. Lowry's request, or what's the remainder of the defense request, is an opportunity to examine a prototype of each one of the type of electronic surveillances devices. So that looks to me like it's a HAWK8A, a RAVEN2A, and an EAGLE8C.

But the one other thing I just want to point out -- and that's something that's just become apparent to me over the course of these hearings --



is in responding to our letter, the Government did, I think, make an effort to respond directly and to be concise, and answer our questions. And for that I'm appreciative.

I do note there are errors in the Government's response. One that jumped out at me today is the Government is reporting to us and to the Court that Mr. Duran had two separate ELSUR devices at different points in time. And the exhibits in -- the pages of Exhibit B show that Duran at least had three separate devices: 1168, 730, and 1188. And so it is troubling.

This stuff is complicated. It's difficult to understand. It's difficult to analyze. But it's troubling that the Government continues to be inaccurate and make mistakes in terms of what it's disclosing about who had what when. But I think --

THE COURT: But that's a separate issue, though, from looking at the device issue.

MS. JACKS: Correct. I just want to point out, we've certainly learned a lot. And I think that it's been helpful to try to understand where we go from here.

But I guess my point is only that, sort of the target has changed over the course of this

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litigation. And I think we have gotten answers. And basically what we know now is to examine the devices for the metadata would be a fruitless action because the Government destroyed that information when they downloaded the device and erased it.

THE COURT: Maybe I missed this point, but I thought he testified that when you download, you don't have it on the machine anymore. I mean, it's not like, if I make a CD of something on my hard drive, it's still on the hard drive. Here, when you download, you lose it off the device.

MS. JACKS: Maybe I failed to ask the right question on cross-examination. I have some testimony from the other cases that Mr. Beck provided. And it's my understanding it's sort of a two-step process; you download, and then you're given the opportunity to delete or not delete. So if I'm misstating that --

MR. BECK: Ms. Jacks is correct. Yeah, it prompts the ELSUR operations technician. When the download is complete, it says, "Download complete, okay, erase the device, okay."

THE COURT: I guess the reason that you're erasing it is because you're going to use it again on another investigation; is that the reason?

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MR. BECK: That's right.
THE COURT: Anything else, Ms. Jacks?
MS. JACKS: No, thank you.
THE COURT: Let me ask you one question:
So you don't add anything to the universe of requests
here that Ms. Sirignano and Mr. Lowry had? Those
three items are still the ones that you don't have
anything to add to that list?
MS. JACKS: I really don't. The only thing
I wanted to add was there are three devices, and give
you the names of them, because those three devices
were used by various cooperating witnesses in the
same manner.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms.
Jacks.
Anyone else? Mr. Lowry?
MR. LOWRY: Just to follow up on Ms. Jacks'
point. If the Court was inclined, preferably I'd
like to see the original devices, not to examine
metadata, but to test the real devices that were
used. But if the Court is inclined to get the
prototypes, I'd like to get some kind of admission
out of the United States about, Well, you can't
complain that the pressure points or the illumination
on this device is unlike the one on the actual



1 devices, when they have access to those and could 2 make them available for us to look at, Your Honor. 3 So that's really the only point. 4 And finally, Your Honor, in Mr. Beck's 5 defense I was complimenting his writing on the way down here to my colleague, Theresa Duncan, to say: 6 7 He had a marvelous mentor, because you could tell by the way he patterned his brief, it was definitely Mr. 8 9 Beck's work product. So I think it's fair to say --10 THE COURT: You always want the judge to 11 write his opinion out of your brief. That's what 12 you --13 MR. LOWRY: He did a good job laying it out 14 for you just in a manner that you would like, so. 15 THE COURT: Thanks, Mr. Lowry. 16 All right. Mr. Beck? 17 MR. BECK: So I see -- I think Mr. Lowry 18 makes a point. I went back over Chapman. I found it 19 during the break. It looks to me like in that case 20 what the Court required to be disclosed was the evidentiary DVD. I didn't glean from that that they 21 22 required the device to be disclosed. And in fact, 23 then they had an audio/video technician person look 24 at the DVD, I'm assuming in the way we did today in 25 And they didn't find any sign of tampering.



And so their request to allow a forensic computer scientist expert to examine the actual device was denied, from what I gather reading it.

And I think properly so. I think, as everyone acknowledges, there is nothing else on these devices afterwards. And I think Mr. -- and I think Special Agent Williamson's testimony was it is an intentional press of a button by the operations ELSUR technician to delete the device.

I will talk about DVD 20 that we've heard a lot of testimony about. To sum up Agent Williamson's testimony about DVD 20, the problems with the computer battery that recorded the date and time were not -- they weren't -- I guess I'm going to use my own phrasing here -- like a terminal error. Meaning that it corrupted the data. What happened was, when that data is recorded on the device, and creates those files we looked at, 1168.001, the binary coding in there is all correct. But when that goes through the proprietary software, it just displays the date that was on the computer, which is nothing. Which is that 1899 date.

And so I think when Ms. Sirignano was saying, it would be good -- or why didn't they then send that device back to Quantico, and then back to

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the manufacturer so they could look at the device, the answer is that, if there is corrupted data on a device, it doesn't download, you can't complete the download. What the download does is it used that SHA -- I'm not technical, but that check value to make sure that the data is the same. And as long as it is, as long as it's all the same data on the device that's downloaded onto the DVD, it completes the download. And you delete it.

And so whether someone, the operations technician in Albuquerque, or the technically trained agent even saw on the player that there was no date and time there, because it downloaded fully, because it completed that DVD, that established that there was nothing else to be gained from the device.

So I think Agent Williamson said there would be no point in sending that back to the manufacturer. And that's why, because he confirmed that all the information on that device was on the DVD. It's not accurate for when it was recorded, but it's accurate for the information that was created on the DVD.

So I think we've established that inspecting, or having access to the devices for purposes of looking at the metadata on them or



examining the metadata won't work. With one other caveat: I think they talked about giving their computer expert access to the device so that they could check the data on the evidentiary DVD is the same as the data provided on the copies to them.

That's what we went through at the beginning with Special Agent Williamson, where he used a third-party hash software to check the hash values. So that third-party software that's available to anyone, including us in this room, checked and saw that the hash value that was assigned when the recording was downloaded in the ELSUR technician office in Albuquerque was the same as the copy of the DVD he was playing today.

And so they can go and use -- I mean, they can provide that evidentiary DVD, I'm assuming, to their computer technician, computer forensic expert, who can then check the hash values, and come up with that same thing, that the hash values that were downloaded originally as part of that file are the same hash values as they will get when they run it through a hash check software.

So then we come to the last point here, which is the physical inspection of the devices.

Mr. Duran had, in prison, multiple devices. I



1 believe that he had an ELSUR-type HAWK, EAGLE 2 recording device; that was one. And then he also had a consensual wiretap on a phone there, which was two. 3 So to say that there were five or six hours of 4 recording could be those two different mediums for recording conversations. It also could be a lie. 7 And the way we test that is with Mr. Duran up there 8 on the witness stand.

I think that they were saying, the defense was saying that they need access to the device so they can prepare for the witness saying that it was unintentional that they turned it off or not; they didn't know they turned it off, something like that. I think there are a couple of ways to corroborate that or not. One would be to listen to the recordings. If it stops at the end of a conversation, and then turns off, that obviously corroborates that they didn't turn it off unintentionally, or they intentionally did it.

Special Agent Williamson's testimony was that he couldn't tell whether they intentionally turned off the recording or not was credible. can see whether the device malfunctioned in some way, or the batteries died. That's all told by the flags. So you can tell from the player software whether a

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session was completed by turning on and off the device.

If you look at the timestamps on there, you can account for every hour, minute, and second that it was inside the prison after it had been activated the first time, to when it was turned off the last time, aside from DVD 20, you can't do that on DVD 20. But with the other ones, even though the dates may be wrong, you're still accounting for all that time there.

If one inspects the device and looks at it, I am thinking -- I anticipate that Mr. Lowry's argument about whether you can easily turn on and off the device or see the light blinking would be my interpretation of how easy it is to turn on and off the device and see the light, which would be different than Mr. Duran's or Mr. Cordova's. And I say that because I anticipate that the defendant will say: It's very difficult to turn on or off the device unintentionally. You have to flip the button or you have to press the button. And you can't do that unintentionally, to which I am sure the person on the witness stand saying that they did so unintentionally, if that would be their testimony, would say, well, it's obviously very easy because I

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did it. I had it in my pocket. I hit the off button, must have, that's why it stopped recording, or it must have hit the on or off switch, that's why it stopped recording.

So I really don't anticipate there will be useful evidence gathered from looking at these devices physically. I think everyone will disagree about how easy or difficult it is to unintentionally turn off the recording device.

THE COURT: Stay right there. Let me ask

Mr. Lowry: If the software -- given this rule change
that you have, and you have the hash value that on
the material you could check it with just commercial
software that's available on the market, what are you
going to get additional of going and looking at the
original?

I'm sorry, I should probably ask that of Ms. Sirignano. What do you gain -- if you can just check it with over-the-counter software, what do you gain by getting the original? You can tell if there has been monkey business here with over-the-counter software, can't you?

MS. SIRIGNANO: Your Honor, based on the testimony from today, the special agent said that there was this over-the-counter software to compare

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the hash values, which our expert is saying is like a fingerprint of the actual recording. Now, whether or not there is something other than a straight comparison of the actual hash values that's on the internet, I'd have to get back to the Court after I speak with Mr. Bryan.

THE COURT: Because when I read that rule, which they are educating us as judges at schools and seminars, it seems to me that what Mr. Beck is saying is correct, you're not going to gain anything by putting your hands on the original, because the copy you can tell there was a problem.

MS. SIRIGNANO: I disagree with that, Your Honor, insomuch as the FBI did decide to destroy the evidence on the device.

THE COURT: But that's going back to the original issue, which, you know, you'll have your say at trial on that. But at least the copy, I'm not understanding how looking at the copy gives you anything more than -- the first copy gives you anything more than looking at the second or third copy, because of the hash values they're going to be on all.

MS. SIRIGNANO: Your Honor, what we didn't hear today was that the agent did the hash value



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     check on the original. We heard that the agent --
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     the original copy, let's just say it that way, which
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     is in evidence -- and who knows what --
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               THE COURT: But I guess what I'm
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     understanding, from what I'm hearing at schools, and
     what the rules say is, you could take the hundredth
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     copy and determine that -- if there is a problem,
    because of the hash value.
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               MS. SIRIGNANO: Unless, of course, Your
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     Honor, the scenario would be is that the original
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     copy, the hash value itself was manipulated in some
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         And then each subsequent copy, whether it's the
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    hundredth copy, would reflect the initial
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     manipulation. We don't know that. We didn't hear
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     that from the agent today. What we heard was that he
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     looked at copies, which --
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               THE COURT: From what I understand, you
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     can't do that.
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               MS. SIRIGNANO:
                               I don't -- Your Honor, if I
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     could have a minute to consult with my expert, I can
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     get back to you.
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               THE COURT:
                           All right.
23
                               Thank you.
               MS. SIRIGNANO:
               MR. BECK: I think I can answer that. I
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     got into that with Agent Williamson about how the
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proprietary software works; that they give that all to ADS, the company that manufactures that, so that they have the checks and balances in place, meaning that, if there is some manipulation of the data, which everyone agrees they really can't do, it just won't play on that player. So that's how they double-check the ADS works.

So if you think about this, where we have -- you know, I think on one hand that other law enforcement, state, local, and international use this company to manufacture devices is probative of the checks and balances they have in place. But compared to, like a painting that we've never seen, borrowing from Mr. Lowry's example -- he's obviously much more well versed in art history than I am -- but a painting that we've never seen, the way that we would check to make sure that the second -- the copy in court is an accurate representation of the original is different when we're talking about a recording.

You can authenticate a voice recording by having, you know, some expert come in and say that person's voice is exactly what I'm hearing on this end. So the way that we check that -- I think Special Agent Williamson got into this a little bit -- is that they make a recording with the device,

maybe they record themselves -- Special Agent Williamson would record himself -- and then they go back and they play that through the recorder. it plays and it is his voice, well, then you know that whatever internal coding the proprietary software has, has worked, because you downloaded it; it didn't show an error when you downloaded it; you played it, it was able to play, and it's your voice on the recording. And so that's the way that they can double-check to make sure that the data integrity is being maintained without having to, number one, get access of their proprietary software, and number two, check with a third-party vendor to make sure that someone has done that. Because a voice recording, there are these things that you can do to make sure that the checks and balances are in place. THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this: much resistance do you have to their expert coming over and doing it on the original? I think we could -- I certainly MR. BECK: think we could accommodate that. I don't know whether we need to. Because, as Ms. Sirignano correctly pointed out, Special Agent Williamson did not testify that he has verified the values -- the hash values of the original evidentiary DVDs, because



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I didn't ask him to. If we seek to admit these at trial, we would either have to have someone testify to that, stipulate to it, which would mean we'd have to prove that we did it, or a certificate, likely from Special Agent Williamson, that says: I have had in my possession the original evidentiary DVDs. have done the hash value checks and they all check out. So I'm saying I don't have much opposition to that, because it's going to have to be done I just don't know if we need to do that. somehow. THE COURT: Ms. Sirignano.

MS. SIRIGNANO: Your Honor, so after consulting with Mr. Bryan, the way he explained this to me is that, when you download the original recording, it creates a hash on that copy. And then each subsequent copy creates a hash or a fingerprint.

And so what we heard today was that this expert didn't go back to the original hash from the original downloaded recording to make that original copy. And so all he did was compare his copy to the previous hash.

There is one file on all of this -- the evidence that was given to us that contains all the data values. And if there was any way that those



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data values or the hash within these data values were manipulated, then you'd have a problem with the subsequent copies. And Mr. Bryan tells me that it would take about an hour total to take a look at this and to ascertain if the integrity of the data is still there, Your Honor. And we would just ask that we could do that sooner than later.

The Government did tell me that they were going to use these recordings. First on my 12(b) 4 B motion, I wrote the Government a letter, and they wrote me back, and based on my motions to suppress Mr. Beck emailed me and told me they were going to use this evidence at trial. So I would just request that we get a time as soon as possible, before the holidays, to take look at this digital evidence, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Well, you're still talking -it's still the original request, take the original
disc, not the copy, and check the hash values on
that?

MS. SIRIGNANO: Right. And I think we're saying the same thing. It's the original disc that's in evidence that can be checked out, and looked at by Mr. Bryan and his equipment.

THE COURT: Well, do you oppose that?





MR. BECK: No, we can coordinate that. I mean, there is no reason to oppose that.

THE COURT: Let me ask on the physical check that Mr. Lowry -- if the concern of the FBI is you don't want anybody to see the shape or the size of it, would there be a way to cover all that device, including covering the outlets, which doesn't seem to be of interest to the defendants, and just let Mr. Lowry come in and push the button, and see if he can any argument from that, and then look at the lights, and but you would keep covered the device's size, shape, and the outlets?

MR. BECK: That, I can't say. That would go above my head to get clearance on that. But it seems like that would be a rational middle ground for everyone to meet, and it seems like it would assuage sort of the FBI's concerns, and allow Mr. Lowry to get what he's looking for, which I don't know that he's demonstrated a compelling need. But it was a good argument. So --

THE COURT: Well, what concerns me is -- I don't want to put words in Mr. Lowry's mouth, but it seems like attacking Duran's recording abilities is about his only defense, or his chief defense here.

If that's really where they're going, but it's that

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crucial that they're going to go after his recording abilities, and I guess credibility as well.

MR. BECK: I agree, Your Honor. And he did come forth with -- I mean, I think we look at the Chapman decision, and why they didn't allow the devices to be produced, which was that they didn't have evidence that the data had been manipulated at all. I think Mr. Lowry made a good point that, to corroborate some of Mr. Baca's arguments about Mr. Duran's contentions about the recordings, he needs to have access to the device.

So I think the Court's middle ground is a rational solution. And as I said, I can't represent that we would agree to that, but it sounds rational to me.

THE COURT: What is the -- I mean, if this is revealing some strategy, you know, I'll entertain that I don't want an answer, but what is the Government's position going to be in explaining how Duran is saying he's got five, six hours, and we've got less than an hour?

MR. BECK: I can't say that, because I don't know, not because I don't want to answer it. I mean, that's just one of those things we have at trial. If we don't have five or six hours of

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recording at that point in time to back that up, I don't know that we'll be able to explain that, other than relying on Mr. Duran's explanation.

THE COURT: All right. Well, my suggestion on this is maybe you talk to the people you need to talk to, see if something like that could be worked out, and then, I think we probably exhausted the issues on this recorder device.

MR. BECK: I think so, too, Your Honor. It would be my expectation that we could have an answer to Mr. Lowry by the end of the hearings this week, and to the Court. To the extent that Mr. Lowry gets to see it, we can decide whether one disclosure is sufficient or whether there will be multiple defendants there who have shown a compelling need for it. But certainly, I think, Mr. Lowry has, and probably a lot of the other defendants are in the same position as he is.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else on the motion, Mr. Beck?

MR. BECK: Just -- yeah, for the record, I didn't know this, but I've been informed of the corresponding DVD numbers, so when we were referring to 1D55, that's DVD 19; 1D56 is DVD 20, 1D60 is DVD 23, and 1D58 is DVD 17.

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THE COURT: All right. Anything further? 1 2 Nothing further, Your Honor. MR. BECK: 3 Thank you, Mr. Beck. THE COURT: 4 Everybody comfortable with where I'm 5 leaving it for at least tonight? Mr. Lowry? MR. LOWRY: Yes, Your Honor. I did have --6 7 Your Honor, I apologize for not having this printed off earlier, but it goes to the question you just 8 asked. And I approached the United States, and Mr. 9 10 Castellano doesn't have any objection. I was going 11 to ask Mr. Beck. But we were going to offer as an 12 exhibit the one page out of the master text file, 13 which is Duran's text to the case agent about the 14 five or six hours of recording. 15 I would just point out, at this time it was 16 very early on, about this text took place on October 17 23, 2015. And while Mr. Beck posed the argument that he may have been talking about other recordings, 18 because he had a cellphone, at the time this text was 19 20 sent, Mr. Duran hadn't revealed to anyone that he possessed the cellphone, so he hadn't started to 21 22 actively record anyone, especially my client, using 23 that device. So I mean, the way I'm reading this is

all attributed to that one device. But I could be

wrong, Your Honor. But I'd like to offer that as an

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1	exhibit. And I don't think I have an objection from
2	my opposing counsel.
3	THE COURT: What is that, that will be Mr.
4	Baca's Exhibit A?
5	MR. LOWRY: It will be A.
6	THE COURT: Any objection to that, Mr.
7	Beck?
8	MR. BECK: No, Your Honor.
9	THE COURT: Anyone else have an objection?
10	MS. JACKS: Do you have a Bates number?
11	MR. LOWRY: I'm looking at a PDF of the
12	master text file, and that's page 395 out of 838.
13	But I'm happy to circulate a copy to everyone.
14	THE COURT: Give me one. Anthony Baca's
15	Exhibit A will be admitted in evidence.
16	MR. LOWRY: Thank you, Your Honor.
17	MR. BECK: And I should note, because
18	seeing Mr. Lowry up again made me think of the end of
19	his argument I do not know at this point, but I
20	will get answers for everyone which of the
21	original recording devices still exist today. Some
22	have been decommissioned. These were older model
23	devices.
24	That being said, the FBI Office of
25	Technology Division, Special Agent Williamson



1	possesses exemplars of the models. So I think for
2	the purposes of what Mr. Lowry and Mr. Baca want to
3	see the device for, for purposes of looking at the
4	physical components, the on/off switch and the
5	recording light, those exemplars will be identical to
6	the devices used in this case.
7	THE COURT: So some of them will be the
8	actual ones, and some will be the exemplars?
9	MR. BECK: That's my expectation. And I'll
10	let everyone know that.
11	THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr.
12	Beck.
13	There was some issue about exemplars, some
14	representation. I've lost track who was wanting some
15	representation. Was that you, Ms. Jacks?
16	MS. JACKS: No.
17	THE COURT: No, it wasn't you?
18	MR. BECK: That was Mr. Lowry again. And
19	we will stipulate to his request.
20	THE COURT: Okay. All right. There is
21	nothing else on the recorder device.
22	Ms. Wild has been out of the pocket all day
23	dealing with that funeral. What was the agreement
24	among the parties in your discussions with her as to
25	what we'd go to next?



1	MR. BECK: I think the parties intended to
2	go back to the finishing up of the James hearing.
3	THE COURT: The James hearing, okay. Is
4	everybody in agreement with that?
5	MS. SIRIGNANO: Your Honor, I don't believe
6	that's correct. But I need to check my emails first.
7	I think it was Mr. Villa's and Ms. Bhalla's motions
8	to suppress, because they've got their witnesses
9	subpoenaed for tomorrow and Wednesday.
10	MS. BHALLA: That's correct, Your Honor.
11	Our expert is here from D.C., and
12	MR. BECK: I meant this afternoon
13	tomorrow yeah, my impression is that tomorrow
14	morning. I know the Court likes to use all the time,
15	so we've got three minutes left. I thought that's
16	what the Court was referring to.
17	THE COURT: Well, how much more do you have
18	on the James hearing? A fair amount?
19	MR. BECK: I think we've still got a fair
20	amount, yeah. Tomorrow, I believe, first thing we're
21	going to start with the motion to suppress.
22	THE COURT: All right. So everybody is in
23	agreement where we're going?
24	Well, let's go ahead you're right, I am
25	very tempted to try to get three minutes out. But

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let's go ahead and shut it down for the day. And
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     I'll see y'all tomorrow morning.
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                All right. I appreciate everybody's hard
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     work.
            Everybody be safe in your travels.
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                (The Court stood in recess.)
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I, Jennifer Bean, FAPR, RDR, CRR, RMR, CCR,
Official Court Reporter for the State of New Mexico,
do hereby certify that the foregoing pages constitute
a true transcript of proceedings had before the said
Court, held in the District of New Mexico, in the
matter therein stated.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand on December 18, 2017.

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